Cited by

Opinions in New Hampshire that cite Appeal of Rowan, 694 A.2d 1002.

16 citing documents.

In the Matter of Frederick Wilkinson and Lisa Wilkinson N.H. 2023
RSA 458:19-aa, VII (providing that “the court may make orders for the modification or termination of term alimony upon a finding of the payee’s cohabitation” (emphasis added)); Appeal of Rowan, 142 N.H. 67, 71 (1997) (explaining the general rule that the word “may” is permissive and indicates a discretionary matter).1 Next, the husband argues that the trial court erred by “not considering [the wife’s] capacity for employment in making its award of alimony.” He acknowledges that the wife had been
State of New Hampshire v. Volodymyr Zhukovskyy N.H. 2021
RSA 597:2, IV(a); see Appeal of Rowan, 142 N.H. 67, 71 (1997) (“It is the general rule that in statutes.
Appeal of Aaron Geller, M.D. N.H. 2019
RSA 329:17, VIII (2017); see Appeal of Rowan, 142 N.H. 67, 70 (1997).
Fred S. Teeboom v. City of Nashua Daniel Moriarty v. 213 A.3d 877 N.H. 2019
The word "shall" denotes that the override provision and the supermajority vote are mandatory requirements.
Appeal of Kasey L. Dillon, P.A. & a. N.H. 2019
RSA 328- D:8 (2017); RSA 329:17, VIII (2017); see Appeal of Rowan, 142 N.H. 67, 70 (1997).
Petition of Second Chance Bail Bonds (State of New Hampshire v. James Castine) 204 A.3d 874 N.H. 2019
When construing statutes, we first look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used.
Appeal of New Hampshire Division of State Police 194 A.3d 488 N.H. 2018
Appeal of Rowan, 142 N.H. 67, 71 (1997) (stating that the word “may” is permissive and indicates discretion, while “shall” is mandatory).
In re of Carmody 62 A.3d 862 N.H. 2013
Appeal of Rowan, 142 N.H. 67, 71 (1997) (“It is the general rule that in statutes the word ‘may’ is permissive only, and the word ‘shall’ is mandatory.” (quotation omitted)).
Dupont v. NEW HAMPSHIRE REAL ESTATE COM'N 956 A.2d 316 N.H. 2008
While we agree that the phrase "shall not" indicates a mandatory command, see Appeal of Rowan, 142 N.H. 67, 71, 694 A.2d 1002 (1997), this neither ends nor aids our analysis.
In Re the Liquidation of the Home Insurance 953 A.2d 443 N.H. 2008
Appeal of Rowan, 142 N.H. 67, 71 (1997) (quotation omitted).
City of Rochester v. Corpening 907 A.2d 383 N.H. 2006
“The intention of the Legislature as to the mandatory or directory nature of a particular statutory provision is determined primarily from the language thereof.” Appeal of Rowan, 142 N.H. 67, 71 (1997) (quotation and citation omitted).
In re Bazemore 899 A.2d 225 N.H. 2006
Town of Nottingham v. Harvey, 120 N.H. 889, 895 (1980); see also Appeal of Rowan, 142 N.H. 67, 71 (1997).
Duffy v. City of Dover 818 A.2d 1251 N.H. 2003
As a general rule of statutory construction, the word “may” is permissive and implies the use of discretion.
Appeal of Gilbert 714 A.2d 216 N.H. 1998
“When construing the meaning of statutes, we first look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used.” Appeal of Rowan, 142 N.H. 67, 71, 694 A.2d 1002, 1004 (1997).
Hanover Investment Corp. v. Town of Hanover 711 A.2d 249 N.H. 1998
RSA 514:1-a; Appeal of Rowan, 142 N.H. 67, 71, 694 A.2d 1002, 1004 (1997) (noting that we construe statutes in accordance with the plain meaning of the words used).
In re Barney 710 A.2d 408 N.H. 1998
“When construing the meaning of statutes, we first look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used.” Appeal of Rowan, 142 N.H. 67, 71, 694 A.2d 1002, 1004 (1997).