Cited by

State v. Boetti, 142 N.H. 255, 259 (1997) (we presume that jurors follow the trial court’s instructions).

(concluding that such statements were “inexcusable,” and “unquestionably inappropriate” (quotation omitted)); State v. Boetti, 142 N.H. 255, 259 (1997) (concluding it was improper for prosecutor to argue during closing that defense strategy did not serve “a truth-seeking function”).

State v. Cote, 143 N.H. 368, 375 (1999) (challenged prosecutorial remarks were akin to a legal argument and were a permissible response to the defense counsel’s closing argument); State v. Boetti, 142 N.H. 255, 262 (1997) (trial court has latitude to permit counsel to respond to opposing counsel’s closing argument); see also United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 31-33 (1988) (no constitutional violation where prosecutor’s reference in closing argument to defendant’s opportunity to testify is f

State v. Boetti, 142 N.H. 255, 258 (1997) (stating defendant waived any objection to curative instruction because he did not timely object to its content).

We presume that the jurors followed the trial court’s instructions.

State v. Cote, 143 N.H. 368, 375 (1999) (challenged prosecutorial remarks were akin to a legal argument and were a permissible response to the defendant’s closing argument); State v. Boetti, 142 N.H. 255, 262 (1997) (trial court has latitude to permit counsel to respond to opposing counsel’s closing argument); see also United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 31-33 (1988) (no constitutional violation where prosecutor’s reference in closing argument to defendant’s opportunity to testify is fair re

of Sullivan County, 149 N.H. 264, 268 (2003); see also State v. Boetti, 142 N.H. 255, 259 (1997) (noting the trial court is granted “considerable deference” in instructing the jury).

In examining claims of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, we must balance “a prosecutor’s broad license to fashion argument with the need to ensure that a defendant’s rights are not compromised in the process.” State v. Boetti, 142 N.H. 255, 260 (1997).

See, e.g., State v. Boetti, 142 N.H. 255, 261 (1997); State v. Bujnowski, 130 N.H. 1, 4-5 (1987); State v. Bureau, 134 N.H. 220, 224 (1991).

There was no “gross negligence” on the part of the State because it sought and obtained a search warrant from the district court rather than the superior court.

“Mistrial is the proper remedy only if the evidence or comment complained of was not merely improper, but also so prejudicial that it constitutes an irreparable injustice that cannot be cured by jury instructions.” State v. Boetti, 142 N.H. 255, 261 (1997) (quotation omitted).

“Mistrial is the proper remedy only if the evidence or comment complained of was not merely improper, but also so prejudicial that it constitutes an irreparable injustice that cannot be cured by jury instructions.” State v. Boetti, 142 N.H. 255, 261 (1997) (quotation omitted).

“In examining claims of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, we face the delicate task of balancing a prosecutor’s broad license to fashion argument with the need to ensure that a defendant’s rights are not compromised in the process.” State v. Boetti, 142 N.H. 255, 260 (1997).

State v. Boetti, 142 N.H. 255, 260 (1997); State v. Vandebogart, 139 N.H. 145, 160 (1994).

*269 State v. Boetti, 142 N.H. 255, 261 (1997); see State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining unsustainable exercise of discretion standard).

Step back.” At that point, it was apparent that the court had “conclusively decided” to give a jury instruction it believed was adequate.

the sufficiency of the indictment.

State v. Boetli, 142 N.H. 255, 262, 699 A.2d 585, 589 (1997) (trial court has latitude to permit counsel to respond to opposing counsel’s closing argument).

State v. Boetti, 142 N.H. 255, 261, 699 A.2d 585, 589 (1997); State v. Bujnowski, 130 N.H. 1, 4, 532 A.2d 1385, 1386 (1987).

At the outset, we find that the county attorney’s actions, as well as her later characterization of those actions, do not constitute prosecutorial misconduct, cf. State v. Boetti, 142 N.H. 255, 260, 699 A.2d 585, 588 (1997) (concluding overreaching occurs “when, through intentional misconduct or gross negligence, the prosecutor has produced a situation in which the defendant could reasonably conclude that continuation of the tainted proceeding would result in his conviction” (quotation and ellip