Cited by

esne v. Hillsborough County Attorney, 167 N.H. 774, 777 (2015) (due process guarantees disclosure of “information favorable to the defendant that is material to either guilt or punishment”), with State v. Adams, 133 N.H. 818, 826 (1991) (right to produce all proofs favorable entitles defendant “only to testimony that is both material and favorable to his defense” (emphasis added)); State v. Graf, 143 N.H. 294, 301 (1999) (“To establish a violation of a defendant’s right of confrontation, the def

Barnet v. Warden, N.H. State Prison for Women, 159 N.H. 465, 469 (2009) (holding that the defendant’s assertion of inadequate notice during parole revocation process did not rise to a due process violation without a demonstration that she was prejudiced by the claimed defect); State v. Graf, 143 N.H. 294, 302 (1999) (noting that we assess due process claims under the principles of fundamental fairness, meaning that a violation will occur when the procedure employed “gives a party a significant a

Second, he argues that the trial court erred when it ruled that State v. Graf, 143 N.H. 294 (1999), precluded him from offering character evidence, in the form of opinion testimony from his ex-wife, that he “is sexually attracted to women, not to children.” We set forth our standard of review before addressing each argument in turn.

State v. Graf, 143 N.H. 294, 304 (1999) (noting preexisting relationship between doctor and victim in analysis of whether victim made statements for purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment); cf. VanPatten v. State, 986 N.E.2d 255, 265 (Ind.

However, neither provision “entitle[s] the defendant to introduce evidence in violation of the rules of evidence.” State v. Graf, 143 N.H. 294, 296–97 (1999); see Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988) (“The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.”).

(quotation omitted); see also State v. Graf, 143 N.H. 294, 296, 297 (1999).

Because “[b]oth the Compulsory Process Clause of the Federal Constitution and the right to produce all favorable proofs under Part I, Article 15 [of the New Hampshire Constitution] give a defendant only the right to produce witnesses, not to produce their testimony,” State v. Graf, 143 N.H. 294, 296 (1999), we conclude that the trial court did not violate the defendant’s rights to compulsory process and to produce all favorable proofs.

“Part I, Article 15 does not entitle the defendant to introduce evidence in violation of the rules of evidence.” State v. Graf, 143 N.H. 294, 296-97 (1999) (citation omitted).

State v. Graf, 143 N.H. 294, 303-04 (1999) (quotations omitted).

We have interpreted Rule 803(4) as having a three-part test for the exception to apply.

Citing State v. Ramos, 121 N.H. 863 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Graf, 143 N.H. 294, 298 (1999), the defendant argues that if a declarant contends that he does not recall the relevant events, a defendant is prevented from having all proofs favorable to his defense produced and from being fully heard in his defense.

etion of the trial court to fix the limits of cross-examination applies to attacks upon [a witness’s] credibility as well as other proper subjects of cross-examination, the trial court may not completely deny a defendant the right to cross-examine a witness on a proper matter of inquiry.” State v. Ramos, 121 N.H. 863, 866-67 (1981) (citations omitted), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Graf, 143 N.H. 294, 298 (1999).

cf. State v. Graf, 143 N.H. 294, 296 (1999) (right to produce all favorable proofs gives defendant only the right to produce witnesses).

In assessing a defendant’s due process claim under the State Constitution, “we look to the principles of fundamental fairness.” State v. Graf, 143 N.H. 294, 302 (1999).

We first address his claim under the State Constitution, State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231 (1983), and look to the principles of fundamental fairness, see State v. Graf, 143 N.H. 294, 302 (1999).

15 of the New Hampshire Constitution gives a defendant only the right to produce witnesses, not to produce their testimony.

The constitutional right to produce all proofs gives the defendant the right only to produce witnesses, not their inadmissible testimony.

*32 “The trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of character evidence, and we will not disturb its ruling absent an abuse of discretion.” State v. Graf, 143 N.H. 294, 297 (1999) (quotation and brackets omitted).

“In order to show a violation of due process under Part I, Article 15, a defendant must show that the [evidence] he was precluded from introducing would have been material and favorable to his defense in ways not merely cumulative of other evidence.” State v. Graf, 143 N.H. 294, 301, 726 A.2d 1270, 1276 (1999) (quotation omitted).

“The New Hampshire Constitution is at least as protective as the Federal Constitution in this area, and we therefore decide this case under the State Constitution, employing federal cases to aid in our analysis.” State v. Graf, 143 N.H. 294, 296, 726 A.2d 1270, 1273 (1999) (quotation omitted).

Because we find the New Hampshire Constitution at least as protective of the defendant’s rights in this case as the Federal Constitution, see State v. Graf, 143 N.H. 294, 296, 726 A.2d 1270, 1277 (1999) (due process); State v. Rideout, 143 N.H. 363, 365, 725 A.2d 8, 9 (1999) (impartial jury), we do not engage in a separate federal analysis, see State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 232, 471 A.2d 347, 351 (1983).

405(b); State v. Newell, 141 N.H. 199, 201-02, 679 A.2d 1142, 1144-45 (1996); State v. Graf, 143 N.H. 294, 297, 726 A.2d 1270, 1275 (1999).