Cited by

Balzotti, 173 N.H. at 321; Keshishian v. CMC Radiologists, 142 N.H. 168, 179 (1997).

The general rule in New Hampshire is that plaintiffs must be given leave to amend a complaint “to correct technical defects,” Keshishian v. CMC Radiologists, 142 N.H. 168, 175 (1997), “before an adverse judgment has preclusive effect,” ERG, Inc. v. Barnes, 137 N.H. 186, 189 (1993); see Super.

Keshishian v. CMC Radiologists, 142 N.H. 168, 175 (1997); see RSA 514:9 (2007) (granting trial court discretion to permit substantive amendments to pleadings “in any stage of the proceedings, upon such terms as the court shall deem just and reasonable, when it shall appear to the court that it is necessary for the prevention of injustice; but the rights of

that is equitable in nature.” Keshishian v. CMC Radiologists, 142 N.H. 168, 179 (1997).

See, e.g., Keshishian v. CMC Radiologists, 142 N.H. 168, 176 (1997); State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining unsustainable exercise of discretion standard).

Keshishian v. CMC Radiologists, 142 N.H. 168, 173 (1997) (“[A] party cannot treat a contract as binding and as rescinded at the same time.” (quotation and brackets omitted)).

We are also unpersuaded by Wyner’s attempt to invoke the “discovery rule” to toll the statute of limitations.

“The application of the discovery rule may require factual determinations, but when an issue arises that is equitable in nature, the trial judge acts as the trier of fact.” Keshishian v. CMC Radiologists, 142 N.H. 168, 179 (1997).

The State also offered, in its motion for reconsideration, to “stipulate to the admissibility of the police report[] to the extent necessary to eliminate any substantial material prejudice suffered by the defendant.” As the defendant correctly notes, however, the trial court was entitled to reject this offer as new evidence proffered in a motion to reconsider.

While ratification may deprive a party of contractual remedies, see Keshishian v. *185 CMC Radiologists, 142 N.H. 168, 173 (1997), it does not deprive the party of tort remedies, see Mertens v. Wolfeboro Natl Bank, 119 N.H. 453, 455-56 (1979).

Generally, a court should allow amendments to pleadings to correct technical defects but need only allow substantive amendments when necessary to prevent injustice.

Keshishian v. CMC Radiologists, 142 N.H. 168, 181 (1997); see also State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining unsustainable exercise of discretion standard).

Keshishian v. CMC Radiologists, 142 N.H. 168, 176 (1997); see also State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining unsustainable exercise of discretion standard).

Corp., 144 N.H. 298, 306 (1999), “we review the trial court’s interpretation of the contract de novo,” Keshishian v. CMC Radiologists, 142 N.H. 168, 177 (1997).

Keshishian v. CMC Radiologists, 142 N.H. 168, 174 (1997); see also SUPER.

*182 We interpret the policy according to its plain meaning, reading the manual as a whole.

Moreover, because the parties and the court relied solely upon the language of the contract in construing its terms, we need not concern ourselves with qny extrinsic evidence and will review, the trial court’s interpretation of the contract de novo.

See, e.g., Keshishian v. CMC Radiologists, 142 N.H. 168, 181, 698 A.2d 1228, 1236 (1997); Exeter Hospital v. Hall, 137 N.H. 397, 399-400, 629 A.2d 88, 89 (1993).

Keshishian v. CMC Radiologists, 142 N.H. 168, 181, 698 A.2d 1228, 1237 (1997) (motion after trial commenced).

Baker v. McCarthy, 122 N.H. 171, 175, 443 A.2d 138, 140 (1982); cf. Keshishian v. CMC Radiologists, 142 N.H. 168, 177, 698 A.2d 1228, 1234 (1997).