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When determining the reasonableness of treatment, “the proper analysis is whether the petitioner presented objective evidence showing, that at the time the [treatment was] ordered, it was reasonable for [the petitioner] to seek further treatment, be it diagnostic or palliative.” Appeal of Lalime, 141 N.H. 534, 538 (1996) (holding that the petitioner’s negative test results did not render the cost of testing and treatment unreasonable).

Thus, we resolve all doubts in statutory interpretation in favor of the injured worker.

“In a workers’ compensation case, the claimant bears the burden of proof on the issue of causation.” Tzimas v. Coiffures by Michael, 135 N.H. 498, 500 (1992); see also Appeal of Lalime, 141 N.H. 534, 537 (1996) (“To obtain workers’ compensation benefits, a claimant has the initial burden to establish a prima facie case.”).

Appeal of Lalime, 141 N.H. 534, 538 (1996) (board calculates reimbursable costs in first instance).

Because the factual question of whether the petitioner’s injury was caused in whole or in part by his intoxication is for the CAB in the first instance, see Appeal of Lalime, 141 N.H. 534, 538 (1996), we vacate its ruling that RSA 281-A:14 applied to bar the petitioner’s claim and remand for it to make factual findings regarding causation.

In addition, where resolution of the appeal requires us to interpret the workers’ compensation statute, “[w]e construe [it] liberally, resolving all reasonable doubts in statutory construction in favor of the injured employee in order to give the broadest reasonable effect to its remedial purpose.” Appeal of Lalime, 141 N.H. 534, 537-38 (1996) (quotation and brackets omitted).

The parties urge us to determine on appeal whether Mello’s medical treatment is compensable under RSA 281-A:23, I. We decline to do so because it is not our role at this stage of the proceedings.

Cos., 143 N.H. 270, 273 (1998); Appeal of Lalime, 141 N.H. 534, 537-38 (1996).

Thus, in order to receive indemnity benefits, the claimant must show a loss of earning capacity due to a work-related injury.

RSA 281-A:31 (1999); Appeal of Lalime, 141 N.H. 534, 538 (1996).

RSA 281-A:31; Appeal of Lalime, 141 N.H. 534, 538, 687 A.2d 994, 997 (1996).

Still to be determined is whether the medical treatment rendered after the *107 1.993 decision was reasonable and required by the nature of the petitioner’s injury.

“We will not overturn the board’s decision, except for errors of law, unless the petitioner has shown it to be clearly unreasonable or unjust.” Appeal of Lalime, 141 N.H. 534, 537, 687 A.2d 994, 997 (1996); see RSA 541:13 (1997).

Although the board is free to weigh the validity of the evidence presented as it deems appropriate, such weighing must be done in the context of the evidence presented, cf. Appeal of Gamas, 138 N.H. 487, 490-91, 642 A.2d 925, 927 (1994), and within the dictates regarding the allocation of evidentiary burdens, cf. Appeal of Lalime, 141 N.H. 534, 537, 687 A.2d 994, 997 (1996).

RSA 541:13 (1997); see Appeal of Lalime, 141 N.H. 534, 537, 687 A.2d 994, 997 (1996).

“We will not overturn the board’s decision, except for errors of law, unless the petitioner has shown it to be clearly unreasonable or unjust.” Appeal of Lalime, 141 N.H. 534, 537, 687 A.2d 994, 997 (1996); see RSA 541:13 (1997).

Here, the governing statute is the Workers’ Compensation Law, which we construe liberally, “resolving all reasonable doubts in statutory construction in favor of the injured employee in order to give the broadest reasonable effect to its remedial purpose.” Appeal of Lalime, 141 N.H. 534, 537-38, 687 A.2d 994, 997 (1996) (brackets omitted).

“Because it is the board’s role, and not ours, to weigh all relevant factors in the *507 first instance,” Appeal of Lalime, 141 N.H. 534, 538, 687 A.2d 994, 997 (1996) (quotation omitted), we remand the case to the board for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Appeal of Lalime, 141 N.H. 534, 540, 687 A.2d 994, 997 (1996); see also RSA 281-A:31 (Supp. 1998).

Further, we liberally construe the workers’ compensation statute, resolving reasonable doubts in statutory construction in favor of providing the broadest reasonable effect to its remedial purpose of compensating injured employees.

“We will not overturn the board’s decision, except for errors of law, unless the petitioner has shown it to be clearly unreasonable or unjust.” Appeal of Lalime, 141 N.H. 534, 537, 687 A.2d 994, 997 (1996); see RSA 541:13 (1997).

Appeal of Lalime, 141 N.H. 534, 537-38, 687 A.2d 994, 997 (1996); Maltais v. Assurance Society, 93 N.H. 237, 240, 40 A.2d 837, 839 (1944).

Consequently, we are unable to conduct an adequate review of this issué.

Appeal of Lalime, 141 N.H. 534, 537, 687 A.2d 994, 997 (1996); see RSA 541:13 (1997).

.’’ Appeal of Lalime, 141 N.H. 534, 539, 687 A.2d 994, 999 (1996) (quotations omitted).