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4 [¶12] RSA 169-C:3, XIX provides three independent statutory definitions of “[n]eglected child.” RSA 169-C:3, XIX(a)-(c); see also In re Thomas M., 141 N.H. 55, 58 (1996).

Although some parental obligations may be discharged by delegation, see In re Adam M., 148 N.H. 83, 84 (2002), “[c]aring for a child’s emotional well-being” requires a parent’s “active involvement,” In re Thomas M., 141 N.H. 55, 58 (1996).

Consequently, our task is not to determine whether we would have found differently; rather, we determine whether a reasonable person could have found as the trial judge did.” In re Thomas M., 141 N.H. 55, 57 (1996) (quoting In re Tracy M., 137 N.H. 119, 125 (1993)); accord In re Craig T., 144 N.H. 584, 585 (1999).

Even when a final dispositional order is appealed to the superior court, the appeal does not “suspend the order or decision of the [circuit] court unless the [circuit] court so orders.” RSA 169-C:28, I; see In re Thomas M., 141 N.H. 55, 60 (1996).

within 30 days of the final dispositional order” and that the “superior court shall hear the matter de 4 novo.” RSA 169-C:28, I. “The term ‘final dispositional order’ is a term of art referring to the order of the district court following its dispositional hearing.” In re Thomas M., 141 N.H. 55, 60 (1996).

The fact that this went on for a period in excess of six months satisfies the statutory requirements to form a rebuttable presumption [of abandonment]; the fact that it went on *618 We agree with the above assessment and reiterate what we stated in In re Thomas M., 141 N.H. 55 (1996): Parental responsibilities come in many forms, and some, we presume, may be discharged by delegation.

Thereafter, an appeal may be taken to the superior court “within 30 days of the final dispositional order; but an appeal shall not suspend the order or decision of the court unless the court so orders.” RSA 169-C:28, I; In re Thomas M., 141 N.H. 55, 60 (1996) (finding that RSA 169-C:28,1, grants authority to the district court, not the superior court, to suspend a final dispositional order during a de novo appeal under RSA chapter 169-C).

On appeal, we will sustain the findings and rulings of the trial court unless they are unsupported by the evidence or tainted by error of law.

We have previously held that RSA 169-C:28 requires “the superior court to hear both the adjudicatory and dispositional aspects of [a] neglect case de novo.” In re Thomas M., 141 N.H. 55, 60 (1996).

Parental responsibilities come in many forms, including providing for both the child’s physical and emotional needs.

“Parental responsibilities come in many forms,” some requiring the active involvement of the child’s parent.'

In re Thomas M., 141 N.H. 55, 57, 676 A.2d 113, 115 (1996) (“appellant has burden of providing court with sufficient record to decide issue on appeal”).

Wilkes v. Jackson, 101 N.H. 420, 423, 145 A.2d 169, 170 (1958); cf. In re Thomas M., 141 N.H. 55, 59, 676 A.2d 113, 116-17 (1996).