Cited by

[¶16] In Union Leader Corp. v. City of Nashua, 141 N.H. 473 (1996), we specifically endorsed the trial court’s use of ex parte in camera review when determining whether records may be exempt under RSA 91-A:5, IV.

[¶11] It is well-established that “[t]he requester’s motives in seeking disclosure are irrelevant to the question of access.” Censabella, 171 N.H. at 427; accord, e.g., Union Leader Corp. v. City of Nashua, 141 N.H. 473, 476 (1996) (describing trial court’s consideration of the requester’s motives as “inconsistent” with the purposes of the Right-to-Know Law).

In Union Leader Corp. v. City of Nashua, we reviewed the trial court’s denial of a Right-to-Know petition based upon prong (C) of the Murray exemption, which exempts from disclosure records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes when disclosure would “constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy.” Union Leader Corp. v. City of Nashua, 141 N.H. 473, 475 (1996) (quotation omitted).

The party resisting disclosure “bears a heavy burden to shift the balance toward nondisclosure.” Union Leader Corp. v. City of Nashua, 141 N.H. 473, 476 (1996).

Union Leader Corp. v. City of Nashua, 141 N.H. 473, 475 (1996).

Union Leader Corp. v. City of Nashua, 141 N.H. 473, 475 (1996).

Union Leader Corp. v. City of Nashua, 141 N.H. 473, 475 (1996).

Union Leader Corp. v. City of Nashua, 141 N.H. 473, 475 (1996) (quotation and citations omitted).

The purpose of the Right-to-Know Law is to provide the utmost information to the public about what its “government is up to.” Union Leader Corp. v. City of Nashua, 141 N.H. 473, 476 (1996) (quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 105 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting), superseded by statute on other grounds); see Department of Defense v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487, 497 (1994) (explaining that “the only relevant public interest in the FOIA balancing analysis [is] the extent to which disclosure of the informa

Union Leader Corp. v. City of Nashua, 141 N.H. 473, 475 (1996).

ancial information does not tell the public anything directly about what the NHRS is up to” and asserts that “[a]t most, the Union Leader seeks ‘derivative use of the information.’ ” We have noted that disclosure of requested information is not warranted when it “does not serve the purpose of informing the citizenry about the activities of their, government.” Union Leader Corp. v. City of Nashua, 141 N.H. 473, 477 (1996) (quotation omitted).

Union Leader Corp. v. City of Nashua, 141 N.H. 473, 476 (1996).

Union Leader Corp. v. City of Nashua, 141 N.H. 473, 475 (1996).

Union Leader Corp. v. City of Nashua, 141 N.H. 473, 476-77 (1996); see United States Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. 749, 762, 771-73, 776 (1989) (analyzing federal Freedom of Information Act).

Union Leader Corp. v. City of Nashua, 141 N.H. 473, 475 (1996).

“The ordinary rules of statutory construction apply to our review of the Right-to-Know Law, and we accordingly look to the plain meaning of the words used.” Union Leader Corp. v. City of Nashua, 141 N.H. 473, 475, 686 A.2d 310, 312 (1996).

Union Leader Corp. v. City of Nashua, 141 N.H. 473, 475, 686 A.2d 310, 312 (1996).

Union Leader Corp. v. City of Nashua, 141 N.H. 473, 478, 686 A.2d 310, 314 (1996) (noting that in camera review is appropriate where release of records may cause invasion of privacy).

The interpretation of a statute, including the Right-to-Know Law, “is to be decided ultimately by this court.” Union Leader Corp. v. City of Nashua, 141 N.H. 473, 475, 686 A.2d 310, 312 (1996) (quotation omitted).

Union Leader Corp. v. City of Nashua, 141 N.H. 473, 476, 686 A.2d 310, 312 (1996) (in the absence of disputed facts, court conducts a de novo review of trial court’s balancing of interests).