Cited by

Bohan v. Ritzo, 141 N.H. 210, 218 (1996); accord Costella, 166 N.H. at 715.

“The denial of a motion to dismiss is proper if the plaintiff’s allegations are reasonably susceptible of a construction that would permit recovery.” Bohan v. Ritzo, 141 N.H. 210, 212 (1996) (quotation omitted); see Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130 N.H. 41, 44 (1987) (court must determine whether the facts as pled are sufficient under the law to constitute a cause of action).

2004) (“Evidence is properly excluded when the proponent fails to make an adequate offer of proof regarding the relevance or admissibility of the evidence.”); see also Bohan v. Ritzo, 141 N.H. 210, 218 (1996) (offer of proof must set “forth the specific basis for admissibility of the proffered evidence”).

Saulnier, 132 N.H. at 414-15; see Bohan v. Ritzo, 141 N.H. 210, 218 (1996) (offer of proof must “set[ ] forth the specific basis for *159 admissibility of the proffered evidence”); accord, United States v. Adams, 271 F.3d 1236, 1241 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[M]erely telling the court the content of...

Denying the motion is proper if the defendants’ allegations are reasonably susceptible of a construction that would permit recovery.

“We cannot base a finding that the trial court [unsustainably exercised] its discretion upon mere speculation.” Bohan v. Ritzo, 141 N.H. 210,218 (1996) (quotation omitted).

“When construing the meaning of a statute, we first examine the language found in the statute, and where possible, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to words used.” Bohan v. Ritzo, 141 N.H. 210, 213 (1996).

In so doing, we assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts alleged by the plaintiff, construing all inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

are not sufficient to meet that burden.” Bohan v. Ritzo, 141 N.H. 210, 218 (1996).

We assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts alleged by the plaintiffs, construing all inferences in the light most favorable to them.

We assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts alleged by the plaintiff, construing all inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

We assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts alleged by the plaintiff, construing all inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

“[W]e first examine the language found *21 in the statute, and where possible, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to words used.” Bohan v. Ritzo, 141 N.H. 210, 213, 679 A.2d 597, 600 (1996) (quotation omitted).

To the extent that we must review the trial court’s decision to exclude Rockwood’s testimony on an evidentiary basis, the proper standard is whether the trial court abused its discretion.

We assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts alleged by the plaintiff and construe all inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Bohan v. Ritzo, 141 N.H. 210, 212-13, 679 A.2d 597, 599 (1996) (quotations and citation omitted).

An erroneous jury charge constitutes reversible error if “the jury could have been misled by the erroneous jury charge into basing its *635 verdict on a misperception of the law.” Bohan v. Ritzo, 141 N.H. 210, 214, 679 A.2d 597, 600 (1996) (quotation and brackets omitted).

We proceed to interpret the statute by focusing first on its language, see Bohan v. Ritzo, 141 N.H. 210, 213, 679 A.2d 597, 600 (1996), by considering “the context of the overall statutory scheme,” Appeal of Ashland, *578 Elec.