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In Smith, we held that “the principles stated in Buie” as to the second type of protective sweep “are legitimate extensions of our own search and seizure law under part I, article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution,” and that “[o]ur constitution should not be interpreted to deny police officers the right to protect themselves from harm.” State v. Smith, 141 N.H. 271, 276 (1996).

In relation, the erroneously admitted testimony was inconsequential.2 Accordingly, we conclude that the State has met its burden of proving that the error in 2This case presents a rare instance of a harmless Rule 404(b) error.

a gun); United States v. Guardado, 699 F.3d 1220, 1223 (10th Cir. 2012) (stating that gang affiliation, as indicated by a defendant’s clothing, can support the reasonableness of an officer’s suspicion of criminal activity); see also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009) (noting that traffic stops are “especially fraught with danger to police officers” (quotation omitted)); State v. Smith, 141 N.H. 271, 276 (1996) (“Our constitution should not be interpreted to deny police officers the rig

We further believe that it “correctly balances the need to search against the invasion which the search entails, and, thus heeds our constitution’s proscription against unreasonable searches.” State v. Smith, 141 N.H. 271, 276 (1996) (quotation, brackets, and citation omitted) (adopting, under Part I, Article 19, the federal “protective sweep” exception to the warrant requirement).

State v. Smith, 141 N.H. 271, 274-77 (1996); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990).

In making this determination, we consider the alternative evidence presented at trial as well as the character of the inadmissible evidence itself.

An error may be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the alternative evidence of the defendant’s guilt is of an overwhelming nature, quantity, or weight and if the inadmissible evidence is merely cumulative or inconsequential in relation to the strength of the State’s evidence of guilt.

We have recognized a plain view exception to the State Constitution’s warrant requirement.

In making this determination, we consider the alternative evidence presented at trial as well as the character of the inadmissible evidence itself.

We acknowledge that the prior conviction was not for a particularly “odious or provocative” act, and thus is “less likely to appeal to the jury’s sympathies, arouse its sense of horror, provoke its instinct to punish, or trigger other mainsprings of human action that may cause a *768 jury to base its decision on something other than the established propositions in the ease.” State v. Smith, 141 N.H. 271, 280 (1996) (quotations and brackets omitted).

Sup Ct. R. 16(3)(b); State v. Smith, 141 N.H. 271, 273, 681 A.2d 1215, 1216 (1996).

Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50 (1983); State v. Smith, 141 N.H. 271, 274, 681 A.2d 1215, 1217 (1996).

Our holding rests on the State Constitution, and we use federal cases solely as analytical aids.