Cited by

Opinions in New Hampshire that cite Knowles v. Warden, State Prison, 666 A.2d 972.

17 citing documents.

  • State v. David Burris 187 A.3d 830 N.H. 2018
    This privilege against self-incrimination permits an individual “to refuse to testify against himself at a criminal trial in which he is a defendant, [and] also privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.” Knowles v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, 140 N.H. 387, 391 (1995) (quotation omitted).
  • Petition of Warden, New Hampshire State Prison 168 N.H. 9 N.H. 2015
    RSA 651-A:1 (2007); see also Knowles v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, 140 N.H. 387, 390 (1995).
  • State v. Burgess 943 A.2d 727 N.H. 2008
    The privilege against self-incrimination found in the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution is comparable in scope to the privilege afforded to the defendant under Part I, Article 15, Knowles v. Warden, 140 N.H. 387, 391 (1995); see U.S. CONST, amend.
  • State v. Mitchell 808 A.2d 62 N.H. 2002
    Similarly, because the New Hampshire Constitution is at least as protective of the defendant’s due process rights as the Fourteenth Amendment, cf. Knowles v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, 140 N.H. 387, 389 (1995), we do not engage in a separate federal analysis.
  • State v. Currier 808 A.2d 527 N.H. 2002
    Because Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution is at least as protective of the defendant’s rights as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, cf. Knowles v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, 140 N.H. 387, 389 (1995), and as the Fifth Amendment, see State v. Settle, 132 N.H. 626, 630 (1990), we do not engage in a separate federal analysis.
  • Appeal of the Office of the Consumer Advocate 803 A.2d 1054 N.H. 2002
    Because Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution is at least as protective of the ratepayers’ rights as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, cf. Knowles v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, 140 N.H. 387, 389 (1995), we do not engage in a separate federal analysis.
  • Criticized State v. Roache 803 A.2d 572 N.H. 2002
    While we have suggested that the privileges *50 protected by the Fifth Amendment and Part I, Article 15 are “comparable in scope,” see Knowles v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, 140 N.H. 387, 391 (1995); Cormier, 127 N.H. at 255, we have also declined to follow federal standards when those standards did not sufficiently protect the rights of New Hampshire citizens.
  • State v. Litvin 794 A.2d 806 N.H. 2002
    Knowles v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, 140 N.H. 387, 391 (1995) (quotation omitted).
  • State v. Barnett 789 A.2d 629 N.H. 2001
    Because Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution is at least as protective of the defendant’s rights as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, cf. Knowles v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, 140 N.H. 387, 389 (1995), and as the Sixth Amendment, see State v. Settle, 132 N.H. 626, 630 (1990), we do not engage in a separate federal analysis.
  • State v. Carter 772 A.2d 326 N.H. 2001
    Although the defendant asserted a State constitutional claim in the trial court, and further relies upon New Hampshire case law in his brief, see Knowles v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, 140 N.H. 387 (1995), he cites only to the Federal Constitution.
  • State v. Gordon 770 A.2d 702 N.H. 2001
    Knowles v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, 140 N.H. 387, 389 (1995); State v. Dixon, 144 N.H. 273, 278 (1999).
  • State v. Budgett 769 A.2d 351 N.H. 2001
    Knowles v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, 140 N.H. 387, 389 (1995).
  • State v. Marti 732 A.2d 414 N.H. 1999
    Because Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution is at least as protective of the defendant’s rights as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, cf. Knowles v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, 140 N.H. 387, 389, 666 A.2d 972, 975 (1995), and as the Sixth Amendment, see State v. Settle, 132 N.H. 626, 630, 570 A.2d 895, 897 (1990), we do not engage in a separate federal analysis, see State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 232, 471 A.2d 347, 351 (1983).
  • State Ex Rel. Morrow v. LaFleur 590 N.W.2d 787 Minn. 1999
  • Marcoullier v. Warden, State Prison 666 A.2d 977 N.H. 1995
    The plaintiff makes essentially the same claims as did the plaintiff in Knowles v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, 140 N.H. 387, 666 A.2d 972 (1995).
  • Wellington v. Commissioner, Department of Corrections 666 A.2d 969 N.H. 1995
    The plaintiff continues to maintain his innocence; he refuses to admit to the conduct underlying his conviction, which is a prerequisite to admission into the SOP See Knowles v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, 140 N.H. 387, 388, 666 A.2d 972, 974 (1995).
  • Cable v. Warden, State Prison 666 A.2d 967 N.H. 1995
    As we stated in Knowles v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, 140 N.H. 387, 389, 666 A.2d 972, 975 (1995), the plaintiff has asserted an invasion of a “third-level” liberty interest, and he “has no right to parole, unless he presents some provision grounded in State law mandating his release upon proof of certain ascertainable facts.” Id.