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Under the balancing test common to Rules 403 and 404(b), we examine whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.

State v. Marti, 140 N.H. 692, 695 (1996) (“The burden is on the State to prove harmless error, and this burden is met only if we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence did not affect the verdict.” (quotations omitted)).

Indeed, we have stated that “some acts have a great emotional impact upon a jury and have greater potential for appealing to a juror’s sense of resentment or outrage.” State v. Marti, 140 N.H. 692, 695 (1996).

Because the first and third prongs of this test entail determinations of relevance and probative value versus prejudice, see, e.g., State v. Marti, 140 N.H. 692, 695 (1996); State v. Dushame, 136 N.H. 309, 316 (1992), we need not separately address the defendant’s contentions that Rules 401 (relevance) and 403 (probative value substantially outweighed by danger of, among other things, prejudice) were also violated.

We held that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to introduce evidence of hundreds of uncharged sexual assaults against the same victim, reversed the convictions, and remanded for a new trial.

State v. Marti, 140 N.H. 692, 694, 672 A.2d 709, 711 (1996) (quotation and brackets omitted).

“The trial court is accorded considerable deference in its determination of whether the prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value,” State v. Tarsitano, 134 N.H. 730, 735-36, 599 A.2d 474, 477 (1991) (quotation omitted), and we will not disturb its decision absent an abuse of discretion, State v. Marti, 140 N.H. 692, 694, 672 A.2d 709, 711 (1996).

Crosby, 142 N.H. at 139, 697 A.2d at 1380; State v. Marti, 140 N.H. 692, 695, 672 A.2d 709, 711 (1996); cf. State v. Hennessey, 142 N.H. 149, 158, 697 A.2d 930, 936 (1997) (admission of other bad acts harmless where, inter alia, they “bore *696 no similarity to the charged sexual acts”).

Rule 404(b) precludes evidence of a defendant’s uncharged bad acts unless they are relevant for a purpose other than character or propensity, clear proof exists that the acts occurred, and prejudice to the defendant does not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.

In 1994, the defendant was tried on three indictments for aggravated felonious sexual assault, each alleging a separate act of anal intercourse with his daughter.

The balancing test for determining whether the prejudicial effect of prior bad acts evidence substantially outweighs its probative value is the same whether analyzed under Rule 403 or Rule 404(b).

This kind of evidence is inherently prejudicial.

We review the trial court’s decision to admit evidence under Rule 403 for an abuse of discretion.

Our conclusion does not conflict with our holding in State v. Marti, 140 N.H. 692, 672 A.2d 709 (1996), another case involving Rule 404(b) in the sexual assault context.

As the trial court noted in its order, “there is, to be sure, prejudice to the defendant by admission of this evidence.” See State v. Marti, 140 N.H. 692, 695, 672 A.2d 709, 711 (1996) (evidence of prior sexual assault is, by its nature, the type of evidence that may lead a jury to render its decision on an improper basis).

To prevail on her argument that the probative value of the evidence of the July 1993 incident was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact, the defendant must show that the trial court’s determination was “clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of h[er] case.” State v. Marti, 140 N.H. 692, 694, 672 A.2d 709, 711 (1996) (quotation omitted).