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We have recognized that, although “a person’s mere presence in a high- crime area, even at a late hour, is not a sufficient basis, standing alone, to justify a brief investigatory detention, the hour and the character of the area may cast an individual’s own conduct in a more suspicious light.” State v. Vadnais, 141 N.H. 68, 70-71 (1996); see also State v. Roach, 141 N.H. 64, 66 (1996) (weighing facts that defendant was nervous and in a high-crime area as factors in favor of finding reasonable s

ion, when they denied using marijuana and nothing in car suggested drug consumption), with State v. Wallace, 146 N.H. 146, 149-50 (2001) (stop justified by reasonable suspicion when the defendant was found near the scene of a recent robbery, dressed in hooded dark clothing, and cast furtive glances before he made a 360 degree turn and continued to approach the police cruiser), and State v. Roach, 141 N.H. 64, 66 (1996) (reasonable suspicion justified investigative stop and further questioning wh

“The application of the appropriate legal standard to those facts, however, is a question of law, which we review de novo.” State v. Roach, 141 N.H. 64, 66 (1996).

“The application of the appropriate legal standard to those facts, however, is a question of law, which we review de novo.” State v. Roach, 141 N.H. 64, 65 (1996).

For a police officer to undertake an investigatory stop, the officer must have reasonable suspicion, based upon specific, articulable facts taken together with rational inferences from those facts, that the particular person stopped has been, is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.

In order for a police officer to undertake an investigatory stop, the officer must have reasonable suspicion, based upon specific, articulable facts taken together with reasonable inferences from those facts, that the particular person stopped has been, is or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.

The officer’s suspicion must have a particularized and objective basis in order to warrant that intrusion into protected privacy rights.

“During a detention, an officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions.” State v. Roach, 141 N.H. 64, 68 (1996) (quotation omitted).

In reviewing the trial court’s ruling, we accept its factual findings unless they lack support in the record or are clearly erroneous.

While we uphold a trial court’s findings of fact unless unsupported by the record or clearly erroneous, see State v. Roach, 141 N.H. 64, 65, 677 A.2d 157, 159 (1996), whether those facts constitute a seizure is a question of law which we review de novo, cf. State v. Cannuli, 143 N.H. 149, 152, 722 A.2d 450, 452 (1998).

“In order for a police officer to undertake an investigatory stop, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion — based on specific, articulable facts taken together with rational inferences from those facts — that the particular person stopped has been, is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.” State v. Roach, 141 N.H. 64, 66, 677 A.2d 157, 159 (1996).

Because the Federal Constitution is not more favorable to the defendant than the State Constitution in this area, we do not engage in a separate federal analysis.

During a valid investigatory stop a police officer may “conduct a protective frisk if the officer justifiably believes the individual is armed and presently dangerous.” State v. Roach, 141 N.H. 64, 67, 677 A.2d 157, 160 (1996) (quotation omitted).

We will uphold a trial court’s findings on questions of fact unless unsupported by the record or found to be clearly erroneous.