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In other words, the 5 [complainant] has not violated RSA 570-A:2, I, if [she] has a ‘good faith’ belief that [her] conduct was lawful.” State v. Mueller, 166 N.H. 65, 69 (2014) (quoting Fischer v. Hooper, 143 N.H. 585, 589 (1999)).

Consent may be express or implied from the conduct of the person under all the surrounding circumstances.

Although under RSA 626:2, IV (2007) a requirement that an offense be committed “wilfully” is generally satisfied if the defendant “acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense,” this statute merely establishes a default rule that is subject to exceptions where “a purpose to impose further requirements appears” in the statute defining the crime.

Fischer v. Hooper, 143 N.H. 585, 588 (1999); see State v. Gingras, 162 N.H. 633, 639 (2011).

To preserve a jury instruction issue for our review, counsel must do more than merely submit proposed instructions to the trial court, see Fischer v. Hooper, 143 N.H. 585, 597 (1999), debate possible instructions with the trial court, see Berliner v. Clukay, 150 N.H. 80, 84-85 (2003), or object generally to the admissibility of the evidence itself, see State v. Eldredge, 135 N.H. 562, 564-65 (1992).

Fischer v. Hooper, 143 N.H. 585, 588 (1999) (explaining that where legislature uses two different words, it generally means two different things).

First, the defendant overlooks the general principle that consent may be express or implied.

In the Matter of Gronvaldt & Gronvaldt, 150 N.H. 551, 554 (2004) (wife not required to offer expert testimony of emotional distress resulting from physical and mental abuse); Silva, 150 N.H. at 374-75 (prisoner not required to offer expert testimony of emotional distress after alleged assault during a strip search); Fischer v. Hooper, 143 N.H. 585, 592-93 (1999) (plaintiff not required to offer expert testimony to prove emotional distress from invasion of privacy caused by improper wiretappi

We recognize damages that do not have physical manifestations, such as mental suffering that may result from an intentional tort.

The scope and wording of jury instructions are generally within the sound discretion of the trial court.

Questions 2 and 3 A tort action based upon an intrusion upon seclusion must relate to something secret, secluded or private pertaining to the plaintiff.

The purpose of this rule is to prohibit a jury from drawing negative inferences from the invocation of the right against self-incrimination.

In Fischer v. Hooper, 143 N.H. 585, 587-89 (1999), we examined the mens rea necessary to give rise to a violation of RSA chapter 570-A.