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We conclude that the trial court’s narrative order and orders on reconsideration provide a sufficient basis for appellate review of the respondent’s claims, and we find no error in its decision not to rule on the respondent’s requests for findings of fact and rulings of law.

A trial court’s findings generally are sufficient when they provide an adequate basis for appellate review.

We conclude that the court’s findings are sufficient for our review.

Geiss v. Bourassa, 140 N.H. 629, 632 (1996) (explaining that the purpose of written findings and rulings is to provide a basis upon which this court may review the trial court’s decision).

The purpose of requiring written findings of fact is to provide a sufficient basis for appellate review.

“The purpose of requiring a written decision stating the findings of fact and rulings of law is to provide a basis for presenting this court the questions of law arising on the facts found by the trial court.” Geiss v. Bourassa, 140 N.H. 629, 632-33 (1996) (quotation and ellipsis omitted).

“The purpose of requiring a written decision stating the findings of fact and rulings of law is to provide a basis for presenting this court the questions of law arising on the facts found by the trial court.” Geiss v. Bourassa, 140 N.H. 629, 632-33 (1996) (quotation and ellipsis omitted).

We have previously distinguished between nonconforming uses and special exceptions, and have explained that “the review standard appropriate to the scope of variances or nonconforming uses” does not apply to special exceptions.

The propriety of affording equitable relief in a particular case rests in the sound discretion of the trial court to be exercised according to the circumstances and exigencies of the case.

A special exception is a use permitted upon certain conditions as set forth in a town’s zoning ordinance.

We review the trial court’s grant of equitable relief for an abuse of discretion.

Therefore, “[w]e review the equitable order of the trial court under the abuse of discretion standard.” Geiss v. Bourassa, 140 N.H. 629, 631, 670 A.2d 1038, 1040 (1996) (quotation omitted).

The board must grant the special exception if the conditions are met, “although the *778 board does have authority to place reasonable conditions on the granting of the exception.” Geiss v. Bourassa, 140 N.H. 629, 632, 670 A.2d 1038, 1040 (1996) (quotation omitted).