Cited by

State v. Farrow, 140 N.H. 473, 475 (1995) (stating that statutes pertaining to the same subject matter “are to be considered in interpreting” one another and will be construed “so that they do not contradict each other” (quotations omitted)).

State v. Farrow, 140 N.H. 473, 475 (1995) (stating that statutes pertaining to the same subject matter “are to be considered in interpreting” one another and will be construed “so that they do not contradict each other” (quotations omitted)); see also Odom, 674 F.3d at 231 (applying “the principle that related statutes having the same purpose shou

State v. Farrow, 140 N.H. 473, 476 (1995) (“This court will avoid construing statutes in a manner that would produce an unjust and seemingly illogical result.” (quotation omitted)).

While dicta in recent cases might suggest that this authority derives from a legislative grant, see, e.g., State v. Kierstead, 141 N.H. 803, 804 (1997); State v. Farrow, 140 N.H. 473, 476 (1995); State v. W.J.T.

State v. Farrow, 140 N.H. 473, 475 (1995) (statutes which deal with a similar subject matter are to be construed so as not to contradict each other).

We will read RSA 597:14-b within the context of other statutes dealing with similar subject matter.

To answer the transferred question, we will address each applicable statute in the context of the overall statutory scheme and we will interpret similar statutes consistently so they do not contradict each other.

“On questions of statutory interpretation, this court is the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.” State v. Farrow, 140 N.H. 473, 474 (1995).

The interpretation of a statute is to be decided ultimately by this court.

In construing statutory language, we “examine [the language] not in isolation, but in the context of the overall statutory scheme.” State v. Farrow, 140 N.H. 473, 475 (1995).

“On questions of statutory interpretation, this court is the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.” State v. Farrow, 140 N.H. 473, 474, 667 A.2d 1029, 1031 (1995) (quotation omitted).

“On questions of statutory interpretation, this court is the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.” State v. Farrow, 140 N.H. 473, 474, 667 A.2d 1029, 1031 (1995) (quotation omitted).

“On questions of statutory interpretation, this court is the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.” State v. Farrow, 140 N.H. 473, 474, 667 A.2d 1029, 1031 (1995) (quotation omitted).

We decline to construe the provision so as to produce such an “unjust and seemingly illogical result,” State v. Farrow, 140 N.H. 473, 476, 667 A.2d 1029, 1032 (1995) (quotation omitted), and thus conclude that RSA 632-A:2, II is not limited to skin-to-skin touching.

“All statutes upon the same subject-matter are to be considered in interpreting any one of them.” State v. Farrow, 140 N.H. 473, 475, 667 A.2d 1029, 1031 (1995) (quotation and brackets omitted).

“On questions of statutory interpretation, this court is the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.” State v. Farrow, 140 N.H. 473, 474, 667 A.2d 1029, 1031 (1995) (quotation omitted).

“On questions of statutory interpretation, this court is the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.” State v. Farrow, 140 N.H. 473, 474, 667 A.2d 1029, 1031 (1995) (quotation omitted).

“When interpreting two statutes which deal with a similar subject matter, we will construe them so that théy do not contradict each other, and so that they will lead to reasonable results' and effectuate the legislative purpose of the statute.” State v. Farrow, 140 N.H. 473, 475, 667 A.2d 1029, 1031 (1995) (quotation omitted).

“On questions of statutory interpretation, this court is the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.” State v. Farrow, 140 N.H. 473, 474, 667 A.2d 1029, 1031 (1995) (quotation omitted).

State v. Farrow, 140 N.H. 473, 475, 667 A.2d 1029, 1031 (1995) (per curiam) (court interprets statutes “in the context of the overall statutory scheme”).

He contends, however, that as the more specific statute, RSA 491:19 governs where the two conflict.

“[T]his court is the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute *591 considered as a whole,” State v. Farrow, 140 N.H. 473, 474, 667 A.2d 1029, 1031 (1995) (quotations omitted), and when the issue raised presents a new question of statutory construction, we begin our analysis with an examination of the statutory language, see Petition of Public Serv.

We read statutory provisions “not in isolation, but in the context of the overall statutory scheme.” State v. Farrow, 140 N.H. 473, 475, 667 A.2d 1029, 1031 (1995).

It is true that statutes are construed not in isolation but in the context of the overall statutory scheme.

We interpret statutes “not in isolation, but in the context of the overall statutory scheme.” State v. Farrow, 140 N.H. 473, 475, 667 A.2d 1029, 1031 (1995).

We avoid construing statutes in a manner that would produce such “seemingly illogical results.” State v. Farrow, 140 N.H. 473, 476, 667 A.2d 1029, 1032 (1995).

In interpreting the statutory language, we examine RSA 356-B:65, III “in the context of the overall statutory scheme,” Opinion of the Justices (Solid Waste Disposal), 135 N.H. 543, 545, 608 A.2d 870, 872 (1992), construing it to be consistent with, and not contradictory to, other provisions of the Condominium Act.

Consequently, after examination of the trustee process statute as a whole, see State v. Farrow, 140 N.H. 473, 475, 667 A.2d 1029, 1031 (1995) (this court examines specific statutes “not in isolation, but in the context of the overall statutory scheme”), we interpret the phrase “at the time of the service of the writ upon him, or any time after” in the general charging statute, RSA 512:20, to mean from the period of the serv