Cited by

Conrad v. Hazen, 140 N.H. 249, 251-52 (1995) (describing when a cause of action accrues).

While in some cases we have explicitly found the statutory language under consideration to be ambiguous before applying this rule, see, e.g., id., we have not uniformly done so, see, e.g., Conrad v. Hazen, 140 N.H. 249, 251-52 (1995).

Although a cause of action arises as soon as all of the necessary elements are present, Conrad v. Hazen, 140 N.H. 249, 252 (1995), it does not accrue “until the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, both the fact of an injury and the cause thereof.” Id.

“When construing the meaning of a statute, we first examine the language found in the statute, and where possible, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to words used.” Conrad v. Hazen, 140 N.H. 249, 251 (1995) (quotation omitted).

A cause of action for legal malpractice in a civil proceeding accrues when an attorney breaches a professional duty, damages occur as a result, and the claimant *214 knows or should know of the injury and its cause.

“The doctrine of fraudulent concealment is an equitable ground to justify the tolling of the statute of limitations based on the wrongful conduct of the defendant.” Conrad v. Hazen, 140 N.H. 249, 253 (1995).

negligence is coupled with harm to the plaintiff.

The discovery rule, now codified in RSA 508:4, I, see Conrad v. Hazen, 140 N.H. 249, 251 (1995), states that when the injury and its causal relationship to the act or omission were not discovered and could not reasonably have been discovered at the time of the act or omission, the action shall be commenced within 3 years of the time the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence

At this time, the plaintiffs injury was “sufficiently serious to apprise the plaintiff that a possible violation of his rights has taken place.” Conrad v. Hazen, 140 N.H. 249, 251 (1995).

However, “[the] legislature is presumed to have adopted a new statute in light of earlier acts on the same subject.” Conrad v. Hazen, 140 N.H. 249, 252 (1995) (quotation and ellipsis omitted).

RSA 508:4,1 (1997); cf. Conrad v. Hazen, 140 N.H. 249, 251 (1995).

The trial court found the following facts after consideration of the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

arises once all the necessary elements are present.” Conrad v. Hazen, 140 N.H. 249, 252, 665 A.2d 372, 375 (1995).

until the plaintiff discovers or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered both the fact of his injury and the cause thereof,” Conrad v. Hazen, 140 N.H. 249, 250-51, 665 A.2d 372, 374 (1995) (quotation omitted), to cases of legal malpractice.

l trial,” Mason v. Smith, 140 N.H. 696, 698, 672 A.2d 705, 706 (1996) (quotation omitted), and thus “[t]he trial court must grant summary judgment when it finds no genuine issue of material fact, after considering the affidavits and other evidence presented in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, and when the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Conrad v. Hazen, 140 N.H. 249, 250, 665 A.2d 372, 374 (1995) (quotation omitted); see RSA 491:8-a (1983).

636, 620 A.2d 428, 428 (1993), it occasionally surfaces in summary judgment motions as well, see, e.g., Bronstein v. GZA Geoenvironmental, Inc., 140 N.H. 253, 254, 665 A.2d 369, 371 (1995); Wolf Investments, Inc. v. Town of Brookfield, 129 N.H. 303, 304, 529 A.2d 861, 861 (1987); Dover School Committee v. Euler & Littlefield, 121 N.H. 757, 757, 436 A.2d 71, 71 (1981); cf. Conrad v. Hazen, 140 N.H. 249, 250, 665 A.2d 372, 374 (1995) (superior court treated motion to dismiss raising statute of

The first question on this appeal has been answered by our decision in Conrad v. Hazen, 140 N.H. 249, 665 A.2d 372 (1995).