Cited by

This “discretionary function” exception retains governmental immunity for acts that can be characterized as “an executive or planning function involving the making of a basic policy decision which is characterized by the exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion.” Bergeron v. City of Manchester, 140 N.H. 417, 421 (1995).

Co., 156 N.H. 202, 220 (2007), a municipal discretionary function immunity case); Bergeron v. City of Manchester, 140 N.H. 417, 421 (1995) (addressing the city and the State’s immunity questions together).

land for recreational purposes in exchange for immunity from liability for 1 Although there was no right to recover in tort against the State under the common law, see Sousa v. State, 115 N.H. 340, 342-43 (1975), the State’s sovereign immunity “is the exception, rather than the rule, in tort cases,” Bergeron v. City of Manchester, 140 N.H. 417, 420 (1995).

Bergeron v. City of Manchester, 140 N.H. 417, 421 (1995) (addressing a city’s and the State’s discretionary function immunity together “[b]ecause the standards governing whether a city is immune from tort liability under Merrill do not differ appreciably from those that govern the State’s immunity under RSA chapter 541-B”).

Appeal of N.H. Dep’t of Transp., 159 N.H. at 75 (DOT’s detour plan protected by discretionary function immunity because it involved weighing alternatives and making choices with respect to public policy); Bergeron v. City of Manchester, 140 N.H. 417, 422 (1995) (State’s decision as to whether to install flashing beacon at certain intersection is discretionary function entitled to immunity); Sorenson, 136 N.H. at 694 (decisions regarding traffic control and parking regulations are discretionary f

Appeal of N.H. Dep't of Transp., 159 N.H. at 75, 977 A.2d 451 (DOT's detour plan protected by discretionary function immunity because it involved weighing alternatives and making choices with respect to public policy); Bergeron v. City of Manchester, 140 N.H. 417, 422, 666 A.2d 982 (1995) (State's decision as to whether to install flashing beacon at certain intersection is discretionary function entitled to immunity); Sorenson, 136 N.H. at 694, 621 A.2d 438 (decisions regarding traffic control a

Services, 141 N.H. 747, 749 (1997) (“The[ ] exceptions [to RSA chapter 541-B] are similar to the judicially recognized exceptions to the abrogation of municipal immunity....”); Bergerson v. City of Manchester, 140 N.H. 417, 421 (1995).

“In resolving discretionary immunity questions, we distinguish between planning or discretionary functions and functions that are purely ministerial.” Bergeron v. City of Manchester, 140 N.H. 417, 421 (1995).

v. Town of Conway, 127 N.H. 593, 600 (1986); the location of parking spaces, Sorenson v. City of Manchester, 136 N.H. 692, 694 (1993); the placement or subsequent abandonment of an alleyway on a certain street in a certain place, Gardner, 137 N.H. at 258; traffic control, Bergeron v. City of Manchester, 140 N.H. 417, 422, 424 (1995); and the training and supervision of basketball coaches and referees, Hacking, 143 N.H. at 550.

v. Town of Conway, 127 N.H. 593, 600 (1986); traffic control and parking regulations, Sorenson v. City of Manchester, 136 N.H. 692, 694 (1993); setting of road maintenance standards and construction of a sidewalk when based upon a city’s faulty plan or design, Gardner, 137 N.H. at 258, 259; traffic control and management of roadway safety, Bergeron v. City of Manchester, 140 N.H. 417, 422, 424 (1995); a decision whether to enact maintenance and inspection regulations, Mahan, 141 N.H. at 751; and

Accordingly, in evaluating whether the trial court erred, we must “distinguish between planning or discretionary functions and functions that are purely ministerial.” Bergeron v. City of Manchester, 140 N.H. 417, 421, 666 A.2d 982, 984 (1995).

The “discretionary function” exception retains governmental immunity for conduct that can be characterized as “an executive or planning function involving the making of a basic policy decision which is characterized by the exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion.” Bergeron v. City of Manchester, 140 N.H. 417, 421, 666 A.2d 982, 984 (1995) (quotation omitted); see DiFruscia, 136 N.H. at 205, 612 A.2d at 1328.

Bergeron v. City of Manchester, 140 N.H. 417, 420-23, 666 A.2d 982, 984-85 (1995).