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Hearsay is inadmissible unless it falls within one of the exceptions provided in the rules of evidence.

If a challenged statement is one of fact, but also substantially true, it is not actionable for defamation.

Simpkins v. Snow, 139 N.H. 735, 737 (1995) (“[W]here a statement has independent legal significance, it is not considered hearsay.” (citations omitted)).

Although counsel told the court he had a good faith basis for believing that Rivera told McIntyre he planned to rob the defendant, conspicuously absent from the offer of proof was any indication of a basis for believing that Longval heard Rivera make this statement — as opposed to having been told by McIntyre that this is what Rivera said, which would make Rivera’s declaration double hearsay.

Simpkins v. Snow, 139 N.H. 735, 737 (1995) (statement offered for its truth when it has no significance unless a true representation).

Pierson, 147 N.H. at 764, 802 A.2d 1162; see also Simpkins v. Snow, 139 N.H. 735, 740, 661 A.2d 772 (1995).

Pierson, 147 N.H. at 764; see also Simpkins v. Snow, 139 N.H. 735, 740 (1995).

“Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Simpkins v. Snow, 139 N.H. 735, 737 (1995) (quotation omitted).

“Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Simpkins v. Snow, 139 N.H. 735, 737, 661 A.2d 772, 774 (1995) (quotation omitted).

Justin does not raise a State constitutional claim, so we examine only whether the statute violated his federal constitutional rights.

To demonstrate abuse of discretion reversible on appeal, Ernest L. must show that the trial court’s ruling “was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case.” Simpkins v. Snow, 139 N.H. 735, 741, 661 A.2d 772, 777 (1995) (quotation and brackets omitted).

“Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Simpkins v. Snow, 139 N.H. 735, 737, 661 A.2d 772, 774 (1995) (quotation omitted); see N.H. R. EV.

In addition to finding unfair prejudice, see Simpkins v. Snow, 139 N.H. 735, 741, 661 A.2d 772, 777 (1995), the trial court apparently reasoned that the proffered evidence of motive and bias would tend to confuse and mislead the jury, and cause undue delay and waste time, especially given its remoteness and speculative nature.

The defendants must demonstrate that the discretionary ruling is clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of their case.