Cited by

Ordinarily, we would remand this unresolved issue because applying the first element of the Murphy test “requires further fact-finding,” Appeal of Doody, 172 N.H. at 809-10; however, when “the record reveals that a reasonable fact finder necessarily would reach a certain conclusion, we may decide that issue as a matter of law,” Appeal of Cote, 139 N.H. 575, 580 (1995).

However, “when a lower tribunal has not addressed a factual issue, but the record reveals that a reasonable fact finder necessarily would reach a certain conclusion, we may decide that issue as a matter of law.” Appeal of Cote, 139 N.H. 575, 580 (1995).

The progression of a work-related condition remains compensable as long as the worsening is not shown to have been produced by an independent, intervening cause.

s because “valid alternative grounds support [its] decision” (quotation omitted)); cf. State v. Sawyer, 145 N.H. 704, 706 (2001) (explaining that we would decide, in the first instance, whether the defendant’s conduct constituted consent for the police to enter her apartment because “the parties fully litigated the issue below, and because the essential facts are not in dispute”); Appeal of Cote, 139 N.H. 575, 580 (1995) (determining that, because we had available to us the same documentary reco

at 671 (quotation omitted); see also Appeal of Cote, 139 N.H. 575, 579 (1995) (reversing board’s denial of compensation for claimant’s back injury where evidence established that employee had not suffered from back pain until his repeated exertion at work); Averill v. Dreher-Holloway, 134 N.H. 469, 472 (1991) (applying same legal causation standard and determining that plaintiff pro

Thus, when construing the statute, we resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the injured worker.

Johnson v. Town of Wolfeboro Planning Bd., 157 N.H. 94, 98 (2008); Appeal of Cote, 139 N.H. 575, 580 (1995).

Thus, when construing the statute, we resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the injured worker.” Appeal of Cote, 139 N.H. 575, 578 (1995) (citation omitted).

When construing the Workers’ Compensation Law, we give the broadest reasonable effect to its remedial purpose, resolving all reasonable doubts in favor of the injured worker.

We ordinarily would remand this unresolved issue; however, when a lower tribunal has not addressed a factual issue, but the record reveals that a reasonable fact finder necessarily would reach a certain conclusion, we may decide that issue as a matter of law.

If, on this record, a reasonable fact finder would necessarily reach a certain conclusion, then we may decide that issue as a matter of law.

id.; cf. Appeal of Cote, 139 N.H. 575, 580 (1995).

To establish that her injury arose out of her employment, the respondent was required to prove that her work-related activities “probably caused or contributed to [her] disability.” Appeal of Cote, 139 N.H. 575, 578 (1995).

When construing the Workers’ Compensation Law, we give the broadest reasonable effect to its remedial purpose, resolving all reasonable doubts in favor of the injured worker.

The petitioner’s entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits was decided by this court in Appeal of Cote, 139 N.H. 575 (1995).

Appeal of Cote, 139 N.H. 575, 580 (1995); see also Town of Seabrook v. Vachon Management, 144 N.H. 660, 666 (2000).

“We ordinarily would remand this unresolved issue; however, when a lower tribunal has not addressed a factual issue, but the record reveals that a reasonable fact finder necessarily would reach a certain conclusion, we may decide that issue as a matter of law.” Appeal of Cote, 139 N.H. 575, 580, 660 A.2d 1090, 1094 (1995).

Appeal of Cote, 139 N.H. 575, 578, 660 A.2d 1090, 1093 (1995); see R. Galway, New Hampshire workers’ Compensation Manual § 2.01, at 2-1, § 4.06, at 4-9 (2d ed. 1999).

In 1996, the board reviewed de novo the issues raised before the DOL.

Appeal of Cote, 139 N.H. 575, 581, 660 A.2d 1090, 1095 (1995) (quotation omitted).

RSA 281-A:2, XI (Supp. 1997); Appeal of Gelinas, 142 N.H. at 298, 700 A.2d at 872; Appeal of Cote, 139 N.H. 575, 579, 660 A.2d 1090, 1094 (1995); Appeal of Briggs, 138 N.H. at 627, 645 A.2d at 659.

Because we have before us the same documentary record that was available to the board, however, we will address whether the board acted reasonably in determining that the petitioner failed to establish medical causation.

Once the claimant has met this burden, the burden of production shifts to the respondent to rebut the claims made.” Appeal of Cote, 139 N.H. 575, 578, 660 A.2d 1090, 1093 (1995) (citation omitted).

Read in its entirety, Dr. Drukteinis’ findings could have supported a conclusion that the petitioner has not carried his burden of proving causation, see Appeal of Cote, 139 N.H. 575, 578-79, 660 A.2d 1090, 1093 (1995) (discussing petitioner’s burden to show medical and legal causation), as the doctor opined that “Mr. Chapman, because of his own personality traits and escalating behavior, has caused his own stress rather than the workplace being the source of it.” The board, however, chose to ad

When construing the workers’ compensation statute, we resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the claimant.

Moreover, in order to give substantial effect to a claimant’s statutory right to choose the doctor best suited to the claimant’s needs, see Appeal of Cote, 139 N.H. 575, 578, 660 A.2d 1090, 1093 (1995) (construing the workers’ compensation statute “to give the broadest reasonable effect to its remedial purpose”), we will require only that claimants provide some competent evidence of reasonableness.

has a continuing obligation to provide or to pay for medical, hospital, and remedial care for as long as is required by an injured employee’s condition.” Appeal of Cote, 139 N.H. 575, 581, 660 A.2d 1090, 1095 (1995) (quotation omitted).

Medical causation requires a showing that the injured worker’s disability was actually caused by the work-related event.

Appeal of Cote, 139 N.H. 575, 578, 660 A.2d 1090, 1093 (1995); see RSA 541:13 (1974).

To show this, the claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her work-related activities “probably caused or contributed to [her] disability.” Appeal of Cote, 139 N.H. 575, 578, 660 A.2d 1090, 1093 (1995).

The question of medical causation of a back injury properly belongs within the province of medical experts, Appeal of Cote, 139 N.H. 575, 579-80, 660 A.2d 1090, 1094 (1995), and as long as competent evidence supports the board’s decision, we will not reverse a finding supported by expert evidence in the record even if other evidence would lead to a contrary result, see Petition of Blake, 137 N.H. 43, 49, 623 A.2d 741, 745 (1993).