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The State urges us to overrule our decision in State v. Sterndale, 139 N.H. 445, 449-50 (1995), in which we declined to adopt, under Part I, Article 19 of the State Constitution, the federal automobile exception to the warrant requirement as articulated in Ross and other Supreme Court cases.

The State, however, did not raise this issue before the trial court; we, therefore, decline to consider it on appeal.

While Part I, Article 19 does offer greater protection than the Fourth Amendment in some circumstances, see Goss, 150 N.H. at 49; State v. Sterndale, 139 N.H. 445, 449 (1995) (refusing to adopt an automobile exception to the warrant requirement), our law regarding information voluntarily exposed to third parties is in line with the protection afforded under the Fourth Amendment and diverges significantly from New Jersey law, see Valenzuela, 130 N.H. at 182-84 (relying upon the

“Under the New Hampshire Constitution, all warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, unless they conform to the narrow confines of a judicially recognized exception.” State v. Sterndale, 139 N.H. 445, 447 (1995).

We therefore decline to address the argument and express no opinion as to its merit.

Because the State Constitution provides at least as much protection in this area as the Federal Constitution, we do not conduct a separate federal analysis.

Because the State makes the “oral communications” argument regarding an encounter between the defendant and Rockett for the first time on appeal, it is not preserved for review.

State v. Sterndale, 139 N.H. 445, 448, 656 A.2d 409, 411 (1995); State v. Jaroma, 137 N.H. 143, 148, 625 A.2d 1049, 1052 (1993).

“Absent a warrant, the burden is on the State to prove that the search was valid pursuant to one of these exceptions.” State v. Sterndale, 139 N.H. 445, 447, 656 A.2d 409, 410 (1995).

The State, however, did not raise this particular ground for admitting evidence of the Nottingham assaults before the trial court; consequently, we decline to consider this argument on appeal.

We begin by observing that “[ujnder the New Hampshire Constitution, all warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, unless they conform to the narrow confines of a judicially recognized exception.” State v. Sterndale, 139 N.H. 445, 447, 656 A.2d 409, 410 (1995).

We therefore base our decision on the State Constitution, looking to federal cases only as an aid to our analysis.

“Absent a warrant, the burden is on the State to prove that the search was valid pursuant to one of these exceptions.” State v. Sterndale, 139 N.H. 445, 447, 656 A.2d 409, 410 (1995).

This court, however, has not adopted this test under part I, article 19 of the State Constitution.