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Although we have held that generally the CAB is the proper forum to rule upon attorney’s fee requests for legal services provided at the administrative level, and we are the proper forum for ruling upon fee requests for legal work performed in connection with appeals to this court, see Appeal of Brown, 143 N.H. 112, 121-22 (1999), we have not had occasion to address the applicability of this paradigm where a request for approval of a contingency fee is at issue.

In Appeal of Brown, 143 N.H. 112, 119 (1998), we held that to “prevail” an employee “must have secured a legal right or financial benefit greater than he or she had received prior to the appeal.” In 2003, however, RSA 281-A:44, I, was amended to supersede Appeal of Brown by defining “prevail” as “receiving] an award...

Where a party prevails on some claims and not others, and the successful and unsuccessful claims are analytically severable, “any fee award should be reduced to exclude time spent on unsuccessful claims.” Appeal of Brown, 143 N.H. 112, 121 (1998); see also Funtown, 129 N.H. at 356.

‘We are the final arbiter of the meaning of the workers’ compensation statute, and the nature and extent of compensation to the injured employee is governed by the express statutory language and that which can be fairly implied therefrom.” Appeal of Brown, 143 N.H. 112, 118-19 (1998) (quotation, brackets and ellipsis omitted).

is governed by the express statutory language and that which can be fairly implied therefrom.” Appeal of Brown, 143 N.H. 112, 118-19 (1998) (quotation omitted).

.” To prevail, the petitioner “must have secured a legal right or financial benefit greater than he or she had received prior to the appeal.” Appeal of Brown, 143 N.H. 112, 119 (1998).

This would undermine the compensatory purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Law.

Because we reverse some of the issues on which the intervenors prevailed below, cf. Appeal of Brown, 143 N.H. 112, 121, 720 A.2d.

Whether prejudice has resulted is a question of fact, cf. Appeal of Brown, 143 N.H. 112, 115, 720 A.2d 66, 69 (1998), and we will not disturb the trial court’s finding if reasonably supported by the evidence.

The statute does not define “irregularly” or “on call.” We therefore look to the plain meaning of the terms.

Prejudice is generally a question of fact, see Appeal of Brown, 143 N.H. 112, 115, 720 A.2d 66, 69 (1998), and is central to a determination of whether the lack of notice constitutes a material breach of the insurance contract.

Appeal of Brown, 143 N.H. 112, 116-17, 720 A.2d 66, 70 (1998) (unreasonable as a matter of law for employer to claim prejudice for employee’s delayed filing of notice of injury when delay attributable to employer).

Appeal of Brown, 143 N.H. 112, 113-17, 720 A.2d 66, 68-70 (1998) (applying law effective on date of injury).