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The State further argues that the defendant failed to trigger in camera review because we have previously determined that “[w]hen a trial court knows nothing more than that a victim has spoken with [a provider], the defendant has not established a reasonable probability that the [provider’s] records contain information that is material and relevant to the defense.” State v. Taylor, 139 N.H. 96, 98 (1994).

State v. Sargeant, 148 N.H. 571, 574 (2002); State v. Ellsworth, 142 N.H. 710, 713-15 (1998); State v. Locke, 139 3 N.H. 741, 744 (1995); State v. Taylor, 139 N.H. 96, 98 (1994).

The trial court denied the motion, ruling that “[m]erely stating that someone made a report to a counselor is not sufficient to warrant in camera review.” See State v. Taylor, 139 N.H. 96, 98-99 (1994).

Compare Ayotte, 146 N.H. at 546 -48, 776 A.2d 715, and Pelkey, 145 N.H. at 135, 756 A.2d 598, with State v. Wamala, 158 N.H. 583, 590, 972 A.2d 1071 (2009), and State v. Taylor, 139 N.H. 96, 99-100, 649 A.2d 375 (1994).

State v. Sullivan, 142 N.H. 399, 402 (1997) (sentencing court properly rejected as unreliable evidence “unsubstantiated, unverified statements” made in a probation report (quotation omitted)); State v. Taylor, 139 N.H. 96, 102 (1994) (trial court properly found evidence satisfied requisite level of reliability); State v. Rodrigue, 127 N.H. 496, 500 (1985) (“A judge exercises wide discretion in choosing the sources and types of evidence on which to rely in imposing sentence.”).

State v. Carlson, 146 N.H. 52, 56-58 (2001); State v. Taylor, 139 N.H. 96, 99-101 (1994).

(to trigger in camera review, defendant must assert factual basis beyond the mere existence of counseling records); see also State v. Taylor, 139 N.H. 96, 98 (1994).

Hoag, 145 N.H. at 50; see also State v. Taylor, 139 N.H. 96, 98 (1994).

While normally evidence of the complainant’s sexual history would be excluded pursuant to the rape shield doctrine, the State opened the door to the admissibility of Sylvester’s testimony when it asked the complainant why she pushed the defendant’s hands away and told him “No.” Cf. State v. Taylor, 139 N.H. 96, 99-100 (1994) (defendant opened the door to admission of testimony regarding prior sexual assaults when he testified that he did not sexually assault the victim because he “wouldn’t do a

In State v. Taylor, 139 N.H. 96, 98 (1994), the defendant asserted that he had reason to believe the victim was interviewed by DCYF.

“The trial court is in the best position to make this determination, and we will not disturb such a finding absent an abuse of discretion.” State v. Taylor, 139 N.H. 96, 100, 649 A.2d 375, 377 (1994).

In order to trigger in camera review, the defendant must assert some factual basis beyond the mere existence of counseling records.

The details of the sexual assaults need not be set forth; in deciding this case, we need examine only those facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant’s points of appeal.

The defendant, therefore, did not demonstrate to the trial court that an in camera review of the victim’s substance abuse evaluation was warranted.

Accordingly, we hold that the prosecutor’s statement was not improper, and thus did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct.

Although a defendant is not required to state the “precise nature” of the information sought, id., he must provide the court with a logical factual basis for his request, based on information independently obtained, that the file may yield relevant evidence.

“At a minimum, a defendant must present some specific concern, based on more than bare conjecture, that, in reasonable probability, will be explained by” the information sought.

Since the trial court is in the best position to judge the witness’s demeanor and the impact on the jury, we will not disturb its finding absent an abuse of discretion.

The trial court is in the best position to determine whether the “door” has been “opened,” and we will not disturb its determination absent an abuse of discretion.

The jury potentially could be misled if a court prohibited the introduction of responsive evidence after the defendant “opens the door.” See State v. Taylor, 139 N.H. 96, 99-100, 649 A.2d 375, 376-77 (1994).

We applied the Gagne standard in State v. Taylor, 139 N.H. 96, 649 A.2d 375 (1994), where the defendant sought discovery of material in a DCYS file about his alleged sexual assault victim based upon his belief that DCYS had interviewed her.

He did not put in issue his disposition concerning assaults on minor females.

“At a minimum, a defendant must present some specific concern, based on more than bare conjecture, that, in reasonable probability, will be explained by information in the DCYS file.” State v. Taylor, 139 N.H. 96, 99, 649 A.2d 375, 376 (1994).