Cited by

See, e.g., State v. Canelo, 139 N.H. 376, 378-79, 382-83 (1995) (issuance of anticipatory search warrant constituted an inappropriate delegation of magistrate’s constitutional function to prosecuting authority); McMullin v. Downing, 135 N.H. 675, 680-81 (1992) (where “plaintiff object[ed] to the trial court empowering investigation by a court expert, and del

Thus, the defendant has not persuaded us that we cannot review the trial court’s plain view ruling as the issue has been developed and presented to us. Cf. State v. Canelo, 139 N.H. 376, 383 (1995).

does not mandate that we must interpret our constitution more broadly.” State v. Canelo, 139 N.H. 376, 397-98 (1995) (Thayer, J., dissenting).

An objective determination of probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate is a prerequisite to the issuance of a search warrant.

Indeed, New Hampshire’s constitutional traditions have caused us to adopt greater privacy protections than those provided by the Federal Constitution in the related context of police officers relying in good faith upon a later-invalidated warrant.

Part I, Article 19 of our State Constitution provides: “Every subject hath a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions.” Evidence that is obtained in violation of Part I, Article 19 may be subject to exclusion from evidence in a criminal trial.

Permitting police such wide latitude to enter a person’s private property is “incompatible with and detrimental to our citizens’ strong right of privacy.” State v. Canelo, 139 N.H. 376, 387 (1995).

State v. Canelo, 139 N.H. 376, 380 (1995) (quotation and citations omitted).

Part I, Article 19 of our State Constitution provides that “[e]very subject hath a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his house, his papers, and all his possessions.” The provision serves to safeguard privacy and protect from government intrusion.

The exclusionary rule is a logical and necessary corollary to achieve the purposes for which prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures were constitutionalized.

State v. Canelo, 139 N.H. 376, 387 (1995); Ball, 124 N.H. at 235.

*709 Probable cause is judged by an objective standard.

In State v. Canelo, 139 N.H. 376, 386 (1995), we noted that “Part I, article 19 thus manifests a preference for privacy over the level of law enforcement efficiency which could be achieved if police were permitted to search without probable cause or judicial authorization.” We there adopted an exclusionary rule under our State Constitution, which, in

Alternatively, she argues that the exclusionary rule of Part I, Article 19 of the State Constitution requires that evidence seized as a result of an illegal stop be excluded from a license suspension hearing.

The State attempts to distinguish the case at hand from State v. Canelo, 139 N.H. 376, 653 A.2d 1097 (1995), and argues that the particular circumstances here mandate a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule under Part I, Article 19 of our State Constitution.

The superior court relied upon State v. Canelo, 139 N.H. 376, 653 A.2d 1097 (1995), for its conclusion.

“An anticipatory search warrant is a warrant that has been issued before the necessary events have occurred which will allow a constitutional search of the premises; if those events do not transpire, the warrant is void.” State v. Canelo, 139 N.H. 376, 380, 653 A.2d 1097, 1101 (1995) (quotation omitted).

We first address the defendant’s argument that his statement and the wooden container were “fruit of the poisonous tree.” The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine requires the exclusion from trial of evidence derivatively obtained through a violation of Part I, Article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution.