Cited by

Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708, 717 (1995) (recognizing that parents and students rely on the safety of the school environment and “the importance to society of the learning activity which [takes] place in public schools”).1 1 The Intervenor asserts that the public interest is diminished because some of the interactions

As a general rule, a person has no affirmative duty to aid or protect another.

id.; cf. Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708, 713 (1995) (“[W]hether or not the common law recognizes a cause of action, the plaintiff may maintain an action under an applicable statute where the legislature intended violation of that statute to give rise to civil liability.”).

Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708, 717 (1995) (ruling that a special relationship exists between schools and students because of the compulsory nature of school attendance, the reliance of parents and students on schools to provide a safe environment, and the critical importance of education to society).

Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708, 715-16 (1995) (rejecting argument that statutory obligation to report suspected child 2 abuse or neglect implies legislative intent to create civil liability to children harmed by the statute’s violation).

Snierson v. Scruton, 145 N.H. 73, 79 (2000); Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708, 715-16 (1995); cf. also RSA 352:10 (2009) (expressly providing a civil remedy for violations of RSA 352:7 (2009) and RSA 352:8 (2009) relative to the obligations of an art dealer).

Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708, 714 (1995) (explaining that “[i]f no common law duty exists, the plaintiff cannot maintain a negligence action, even though the defendant has violated a statutory duty”).

nal right to due process, we decline his invitation to “fashion a remedy for him.” See Khater v. Sullivan, 160 N.H. 372, 374 (2010) (declining to fashion constitutional tort remedy for racial discrimination in land use regulation because appeal to zoning board of adjustment provided adequate remedy, even though such remedy was not as complete as constitutional tort would provide); Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708, 722 (1995) (declining to fashion constitutional tort remedy for school officials’ fail

Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708, 713 (1995) (explaining standard as to whether statute creates an expressed or implied cause of action).

that RSA [chapter] 193-F, the anti-bullying statute, was implicated in the assault.” The plaintiff contends that this is a common law claim cognizable under Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708, 720 (1995), and not barred by RSA chapter 193-F.

The plaintiff next argues that we should reverse the trial court’s decision so that it may benefit from discovery and learn “[i]f the school knew of and failed to correct inadequacies in student supervision to prevent foreseeable student injuries.” The plaintiff relies upon our decision in Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708 (1995), to support this argument.

Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708, 714 (1995) (‘Whether or not a common law duty exists,...

Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708, 721-22 (1995) (“Where no established remedy exists.

rty); Dupont v. Aavid Thermal Technologies, 147 N.H. 706, 713 (2002) (plaintiff sufficiently alleged facts establishing employer’s duty to protect employee from imminent danger while at work); Iannelli v. Burger King Corp., 145 N.H. 190, 194 (2001) (teenagers’ unruly behavior created unreasonable risk of injury to restaurant patrons, creating duty to protect patrons from assault); Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708, 717-18 (1995) (schools share special relationship with students, creating duty of reas

The mere “fact that [an] actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another’s aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra § 314, at 116; see Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708, 716 (1995) (“As a general rule, a person has no affirmative duty to aid or protect another.”).

Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra § 314, at 116; see Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708, 716, 662 A.2d 272 (1995) ("As a general rule, a person has no affirmative duty to aid or protect another.").

at 598-99; see Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708, 722 (1995); see also Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983).

In Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708, 717 (1995), we recognized that “schools share a special relationship with students entrusted to their care, which imposes upon them certain duties of reasonable supervision.” In Marquay, three students brought a variety of state and federal claims in federal court against the school district, the school administrati

Relying upon Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708 (1995), the trial court ruled that RSA 169-C:29 did not create a private right of action and that the elders did not owe the plaintiffs any fiduciary duty.

We have held that the duty to protect may arise because: (1) a special relationship exists, see Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708, 717 (1995) (“schools share a special relationship with students entrusted to their care, which imposes upon them certain duties of reasonable supervision”); (2) special circumstances exist, see Iannelli v. Burger King Corp., 145 N.H. 190, 194 (2000) (unruly behavior of rowdy youths created unreasonable risk of injury

Absent the legislature’s express or implied intent to create a private right of action, we conclude that the statute does not do so.

In Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708, 717-18, 662 A.2d 272, 279 (1995), we held that a special relationship exists between primary and secondary schools and their students, and that that relationship imposes a duty of care upon schools to protect students who they know or should know are being sexually abused by school employees.

“Such a duty may arise, however, if a special relationship exists.” Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708, 716, 662 A.2d 272, 278 (1995).

When an action exists at common law, the negligence per se doctrine may define the standard of conduct to which a defendant will be held as that conduct required by a particular statute, either instead of or as an alternative to the reasonable person standard.

“If no common law duty exists, the plaintiff cannot maintain a negligence action, even though the defendant has violated a statutory duty.” Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708, 714, 662 A.2d 272, 277 (1995).