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“The court must, in this analysis, ‘indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver’ of counsel.” State v. Davis, 139 N.H. 185, 190 (1994) (quoting Barham, 126 N.H. at 637).

Courts should “indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver.” Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977); State v. Davis, 139 N.H. 185, 190 (1994).

Any error, therefore, was harmless.

While we strongly prefer that trial court judges conduct an inquiry with a defendant who wishes to waive his right to counsel, see State v. Davis, 139 N.H. 185, 191 (1994) (setting forth *330 model colloquy for waiver of right to counsel), the trial court in this case had sufficient evidence to conclude that the defendant’s waiver was valid.

The next day, we summarily reversed and remanded to the trial court based upon our holding in State v. Davis, 139 N.H. 185 (1994), which allows a defendant to proceed pro se in absentia after a jury *18 has been empanelled if he does so in a knowing, intelligent and voluntary manner.

In New Hampshire, “a defendant waives his right to a specific jury instruction unless the request is timely made.” State v. Davis, 139 N.H. 185, 192, 650 A.2d 1386, 1390 (1994) (quotation omitted).

self-incrimination when he made financial disclosures prior to receiving notice of the federal ‘RICO’ Complaint.” *883 We address the defendant’s claims first under the State Constitution, State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (1983), and “[w]here, as in the instant case, the federal law is not more favorable to the defendant, we make no separate federal analysis.” State v. Davis, 139 N.H. 185, 189, 650 A.2d 1386, 1388 (1994); see State v. LaFountain, 138 N.H. 225, 227, 636 A.2d 10

A specific, contemporaneous objection to the trial court’s refusal to give a particular jury instruction is necessary to preserve the issue for appellate review.

We therefore hold that the Federal Constitution provides no greater protection than the New Hampshire Constitution in this instance and undertake no separate federal analysis.

Our conclusion is buttressed by State v. Davis, 139 N.H. 185, 650 A.2d 1386 (1994), where similar factual circumstances were present.

We address the defendant’s claim first under the State Constitution, see State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (1983), and “[w]here, as in the instant case, federal law is not more favorable to the defendant, we make no separate federal analysis.” State v. Davis, 139 N.H. 185, 189, 650 A.2d 1386, 1388 (1994).

Harmless Error Although the trial court erred, the State correctly contends that this case presents the rare instance of a harmless Rule 404(b) error.

When, as in the instant case, the federal law is not more favorable to the defendant, see Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 644-47 (1976), we make no separate federal analysis, see State v. Davis, 139 N.H. 185, 189, 650 A.2d 1386, 1388 (1994).