Cited by

“The only judicial review of a fair hearings decision issued by the [department] is by petition for a writ of certiorari.” Petition of Walker, 138 N.H. 471, 473 (1994).

II “The only judicial review of a fair hearings decision issued by the [department] is by petition for a writ of certiorari.” Petition of Walker, 138 N.H. 471, 473 (1994).

While legislative history may be helpful in the interpretation of an ambiguous statute, it will not be consulted when the statutory language is plain.

We do not consider legislative history to construe a statute such as RSA 72:39-a, 1(c), which is clear on its face.

Our review of an administrative agency’s decision on a petition for certiorari is limited to determining whether the agency has acted illegally with respect to jurisdiction, authority or observance of the law or has abused its discretion or acted arbitrarily, unreasonably or capriciously.

“[W]e will not consider what the legislature might have said or add words that the legislature did not include.” Petition of Walker, 138 N.H. 471, 474 (1994).

“We begin by examining the plain language of the statute using the ordinary meanings of the words to determine legislative intent.” Petition of Walker, 138 N.H. 471, 474, 641 A.2d 1021, 1024 (1994).

“The interpretation of a statute is to be decided ultimately by this court.” Petition of Walker, 138 N.H. 471, 474, 641 A.2d 1021, 1024 (1994).

Petition of Walker, 138 N.H. 471, 474, 641 A.2d 1021, 1024 (1994) (citations omitted).

Accordingly, we look first to a statute’s plain meaning to determine legislative intent, see Petition of Walker, 138 N.H. 471, 474, 641 A.2d 1021, 1024 (1994), and refuse to consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to incorporate in the statute.

When interpreting legislative intent from a statute as *406 written, “we will not consider what the legislature might have said or add words that the legislature did not include.” Petition of Walker, 138 N.H. 471, 474, 641 A.2d 1021, 1024 (1994).

incon *253 sistent with the legislature’s intent,” we must, in the absence of ambiguity and formal legislative history, see In re Estate of Martin, 125 N.H. 690, 691, 484 A.2d 1183, 1184 (1984), derive legislative intent from the statute as written.

We examine the plain language of the statute to determine legislative intent.

“We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written, and therefore, we will not consider what the legislature might have said or add words that the legislature did not include.” Petition of Walker, 138 N.H. 471, 474, 641 A.2d 1021, 1024 (1994).

We generally discern legislative intent from the plain language of the statute, see Petition of Walker, 138 N.H. 471, 474, 641 A.2d 1021, 1024 (1994), but we may “review legislative history to aid in our analysis,” K & J Assoc.

“The interpretation of a statute is to be decided ultimately by this court.” Petition of Walker, 138 N.H. 471, 474, 641 A.2d 1021, 1024 (1994).

Legislative history, however, “will not be consulted when the statutory language is plain.” Petition of Walker, 138 N.H. 471, 474, 641 A.2d 1021, 1024 (1994).

State v. Telles, 139 N.H. 344, 346, 653 A.2d 554, 556 (1995); Petition of Walker, 138 N.H. 471, 474, 641 A.2d 1021, 1024 (1994).

Our review of the statute reveals no such grant of authority, see RSA chapter 80, and we will not add words, and thus bestow specific powers on the town, that the legislature did not see fit to include in the statute.

“The interpretation of a statute is to be decided ultimately by this court.” Petition of Walker, 138 N.H. 471, 474, 641 A.2d 1021, 1024 (1994).

“The interpretation of a statute is to be decided ultimately by this court.” Petition of Walker, 138 N.H. 471, 474, 641 A.2d 1021, 1024 (1994).

Accordingly, “[w]e interpret legislative intent from the statute as written, and therefore, will not consider what the legislature might have said or add words that the legislature did not include.” Petition of Walker, 138 N.H. 471, 474, 641 A.2d 1021, 1024 (1994).

e silent assumptions the legislature entertained when it enacted RSA 362:3-a and RSA 362:4, 1, matter little to our analysis; what is important for our purposes is the statutory language itself, for we construe the legislature’s intent from the statute as written, and “we will not consider what the legislature might have said or add words that the legislature did not include.” Petition of Walker, 138 N.H. 471, 474, 641 A.2d 1021, 1024 (1994).

We review a statute as written and will not add words that the legislature did not see fit to include.

The same standard of review applies to the trial court’s interpretations of New Hampshire beneficiary law.

“The interpretation of a statute is to be decided ultimately by this court.” Petition of Walker, 138 N.H. 471, 474, 641 A.2d 1021, 1024 (1994).

It would therefore be inappropriate for us to delve into the statutes’ legislative history for a contrary meaning.

That parking lots may, on occasion, be functionally related to highways, bridges, or sidewalks does not render the statutory language ambiguous, and it is not our province to “consider what the legislature might have said or add words that the legislature did not include.” Petition of Walker, 138 N.H. 471, 474, 641 A.2d 1021, 1024 (1994).

We can “neither ignore the plain language of the legislation nor add words which the lawmakers did not see fit to include.” Petition of Walker, 138 N.H. 471, 475, 641 A.2d 1021, 1025 (1994) (quotation omitted).

“The interpretation of a statute is to be decided ultimately by *49 this court.” Petition of Walker, 138 N.H. 471, 474, 641 A.2d 1021, 1024 (1994).

Because the legislature’s intent on this issue is not clear from the language of the statute, we consult the statute’s legislative history.

The question in this case is whether the board properly *94 interpreted RSA 72:23, V “The interpretation of a statute is to be decided ultimately by this court.” Petition of Walker, 138 N.H. 471, 474, 641 A.2d 1021, 1024 (1994).

Petition of Walker, 138 N.H. 471, 474, 641 A.2d 1021, 1024 (1994) (citations omitted).