Cited by

In re N.T., 175 N.H. 300, 310 (2022); Smith v. N.H. Bd.

of Psychologists, 138 N.H. 548, 551 (1994) (“In order to warrant a dismissal of the complaints, the plaintiffs, at a minimum, have the burden of showing prejudice due to the delay of the scheduled hearings.”); Robyn W., 124 N.H. at 381 (holding that we will enforce the mandatory time limit applicable to termination of parental rights proceedings by

Our decision in Ruel was based, in large part, on our decision in Smith v. New Hampshire Board of Psychologists, 138 N.H. 548 (1994).

The Board relies upon Smith v. New Hampshire Board of Examiners of Psychologists, 138 N.H. 548 (1994), to argue that the language in RSA 332- B:14, II(c) does not violate the respondent’s right to due process.

of Psychologists, 138 N.H. 548, 554, 645 A.2d 651 (1994) (reversing trial court's entry of injunction that prevented Board of Examiners of Psychologists from conducting disciplinary proceedings involving licensees).

of Psychologists, 138 N.H. 548, 551 (1994) (given statute’s silence regarding remedy for failure to abide by mandatory time limits, court looked to statutory goals to determine appropriate mode of enforcement).

of Psychologists, 138 N.H. 548, 551 (1994) (where statute silent as to remedy for violation of time limit, court looked to statutory goals to determine appropriate mode of enforcement).

of Psychologists, 138 N.H. 548, 552 (1994) (expiration of board’s rules did not preclude board from exercising its statutory authority to determine if the plaintiffs’ conduct was unprofessional).

The State argues that, rather than following our holdings in McCarthy and Russell C., we must consider RSA chapter 135-E in light of our holdings in Smith v. New Hampshire Board of Psychologists, 138 N.H. 548 (1994), In re Robyn W., 124 N.H. 377 (1983), and Appeal of Martino, 138 N.H. 612 (1994).

of Psychologists, 138 N.H. 548, 551 (1994) (subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent of parties).

of Psychologists, 138 N.H. 548, 551 (1994); see also In re Robyn W., 124 N.H. at 381.

I also agree with the majority that the rule does not simply “carry out what a statute authorizes on its face.” Smith v. N.H. Bd.

In Smith v. New Hampshire Board of Psychologists, 138 N.H. 548, 553 (1994), we reiterated this rule in determining that, despite the expiration of its rules, the board of examiners of psychologists retained authority to initiate disciplinary hearings against the plaintiffs because of its “clear statutory authority to initiate and conduct disciplinary proceedings.” Subsequent case

of Psychologists, 138 N.H. 548, 552-53, 645 A.2d 651, 653-54 (1994); RSA 541-A:31 (setting forth procedures for contested hearings).

“Promulgation of a rule pursuant to RSA chapter 541-A is not necessary to carry out what a statute authorizes on its face.” Smith v. N.H. Board of Examiners of Psychologists, 138 N.H. 548, 553, 645 A.2d 651, 654 (1994).

of Psychologists, 138 N.H. 548, 551, 645 A.2d 651, — (1994); In re Robyn W., 124 N.H. at 381, 469 A.2d at 1353; In re Russell C., 120 N.H. at 266-68, 414 A.2d at 936-39, and consideration of whether the party seeking relief has shown prejudice as a result of the statutory violation, see Smith, 138 N.H. at 551, — A.2d at —; Appeal of Maddox a