Cited by

Roberts v. General Motors Corp., 138 N.H. 532, 534 (1994).

at 100-01 n.4 (quoting Congressional report that gave rise to the federal legislation); see also Roberts v. General Motors Corp., 138 N.H. 532, *467 536 (1994).

Roberts v. General Motors Corp., 138 N.H. 532, 536 (1994) (“[C]hapter 357-C is a comprehensive statute governing the relationships between automobile manufacturers and their dealers.

Motors Corp., 138 N.H. 532, 539 (1994) (claim requires allegations that defendant wrongfully induced a breach of contract between plaintiff and a third party).

The issue of whether the appellants had standing under RSA chapter 162-H “is a matter of statutory construction; accordingly, we must begin our analysis by considering the plain meaning of the words of the statute.” Roberts v. General Motors Corp., 138 N.H. 532, 535-36 (1994) (quotation omitted).

Roberts v. General Motors Corp., 138 N.H. 532, 539 (1994).

Roberts v. General Motors Corp., 138 N.H. 532, 538 (1994) (holding that phrase “ ‘including but not limited to’...

Generally, the legislature’s use of the term “any” evidences that the statute should be given a broad reading in interpreting what may be included as a prohibited “other device.” See Roberts v. General Motors Corp., 138 N.H. 532, 536 (1994).

Roberts v. General Motors Corp., 138 N.H. 532, 538 (1994); see also Conservation Law Found, v. N.H. Wetlands Council, 150 N.H. 1, 5-6 (2003) (applying same reasoning to the term “including”).

Roberts v. General Motors Corp., 138 N.H. 532, 538 (1994); see also Conservation Law Found, v. N.H. Wetlands Council, 150 N.H. 1, 5-6 (2003) (applying same reasoning to the term “including”).

Roberts v. General Motors Corp., 138 N.H. 532, 538 (1994).

In doing so, we clarified our ruling in Roberts v. General Motors Corp., 138 N.H. 532, 538-39 (1994), in which we had held that in order for conduct not particularized by the enumerated categories in the CPA to qualify as an unfair or deceptive trade practice, that conduct must be of the same type as proscribed by the enumerated categories.

Roberts v. General Motors Corp., 138 N.H. 532, 538-39 (1994) (holding that phrase “including but not limited to,” for purposes of construing Consumer Protection Act, limits the applicability of the law to the types of acts particularized in the statute).

limits the applicability of the Consumer Protection Act to those types of acts.” Roberts v. General Motors Corp., 138 N.H. 532, 538 (1994) (brackets and quotation omitted).

“In evaluating whether a party has standing to sue, we focus on whether the plaintiff suffered a legal injury against which the law was designed to protect.” Roberts v. General Motors Corp., 138 N.H. 532, 535, 643 A.2d 956, 958 (1994) (citation omitted).

“In evaluating whether a party has standing to sue, we focus on whether the [party] suffered a legal injury against which the law was designed to protect.” Roberts v. General Motors Corp., 138 N.H. 532, 535, 643 A.2d 956, 958 (1994).

“Only improper interference is deemed tortious in New Hampshire.” Roberts v. General Motors Corp., 138 N.H. 532, 540, 643 A.2d 956, 961 (1994).

it is not unlimited in scope.” Roberts v. General Motors Corp., 138 N.H. 532, 538, 643 A.2d 956, 960 (1994).

Roberts v. General Motors Corp., 138 N.H. 532, 535, 643 A.2d 956, 958 (1994).

Dept., 141 N.H. 336, 340, 682 A.2d 710, 712 (1996) (quotation omitted), and lastly, by looking for guidance to other States’ interpretations of similar statutes, see Roberts v. General Motors Corp., 138 N.H. 532, 537-38, 643 A.2d 956, 959 (1994).

In our analysis, “we will focus on the statute as a whole, not on isolated words or phrases,” Roberts v. General Motors Corp., 138 N.H. 532, 536, 643 A.2d 956, 958 (1994), presuming that the legislature did not use “superfluous or redundant words,” Appeal of Derry Educ.

“In so doing, we will focus on the statute as a whole, not on isolated words or phrases.” Roberts v. General Motors Corp., 138 N.H. 532, 536, 643 A.2d 956, 958 (1994).

Roberts v. General Motors Corp., 138 N.H. 532, 538, 643 A.2d 956, 960 (1994).

Co., 119 N.H. 630, 633, 406 A.2d 132, 134 (1979), or tortious interference, see Roberts v. General Motors Corp., 138 N.H. 532, 539, 643 A.2d 956, 960-61 (1994), we conclude that the defendant’s counterclaim is not precluded, on grounds either of collateral estoppel or res judicata, by the bankruptcy court order.

Over one year later, after this court affirmed the grant of partial summary judgment against him, Roberts v. General Motors Corp., 138 N.H. 532, 643 A.2d 956 (1994) (Roberts I), the plaintiff filed a motion for leave for late entry of the second writ.

Because terminating the tenancy encompasses removal of the mobile home, and because the statute must be read as a whole, Roberts v. General Motors Corp., 138 N.H. 532, 536, 643 A.2d 956, 958 (1994), we interpret RSA 205-A:2, III to prohibit removal of an otherwise appropriate mobile home unless justified under another section of the statute.

Roberts v. General Motors Corp., 138 N.H. 532, 538, 643 A.2d 956, 960 (1994).