Cited by

State v. Brown, 156 N.H. 440, 445 (2007); State v. Morrill, 154 N.H. 547, 553 (2006); State v. Kirsch, 139 N.H. 647, 656 (1995).

Rather, the individual offenses constituted part of an “overarching plan” and, presumably, contributed not to the success of each other, but to the success of that plan’s ultimate goal “of furthering [the defendant’s] increasingly profitable relationship with Bayview.” Id.; cf. State v. Kirsch, 139 N.H. 647, 655 (1995) (noting that, under the common plan exception to Rule of Evidence 404(b), the “other bad acts must be constituent parts of some overall scheme[;].

Moreover, “[t]he issuing judge is entitled to go beyond the averred facts and draw upon common sense in making reasonable inferences from those facts.” United States v. Grimmett, 439 F.3d 1263, 1270 (10th Cir. 2006); see, e.g., State v. Kirsch, 139 N.H. 647, 651 (1995) (upholding magistrate’s finding of probable cause on basis that “a common-sense inference about the longevity of child pornography for the sexual abuser of children may reasonably be drawn from the nature of the items themselves”

State v. Kirsch, 139 N.H. 647, 650-51 (1995) (“[I]t would be reasonable for an issuing magistrate to conclude that a person charged with sexual exploitation of children through photographs and similar items would be likely to retain them for an indefinite period.” (quotation omitted)).

“To meet the relevancy requirement, the other bad acts evidence must have some direct bearing on an issue actually in dispute, and there must be a clear connection between the particular evidentiary purpose, as articulated to the trial court, and the other bad acts.” State v. Kirsch, 139 N.H. 647, 654 (1995) (quotations, citations, and brackets omitted).

State v. Kirsch, 139 N.H. 647, 651 (1995) (finding that “‘pedophile profile’ reciting the types of material collected by child molesters and their proclivity for retaining it” was not required to establish probable cause where a common-sense inference about the longevity of child pornography *162 retained by the sexual abuser could “reasonably be

Instead, we review the affidavit in a commonsense manner, and determine close eases “by the preference to be accorded to warrants.” State v. Kirsch, 139 N.H. 647, 650 (1995) (quotation omitted).

*713 State v. Kirsch, 139 N.H. 647, 654 (1995) (“To meet the relevancy requirement, the other bad acts evidence must have some direct bearing on an issue actually in dispute.

Because the State has the burden to prove the harmlessness of an error beyond a reasonable doubt, we can only interpret its failure to argue the issue as an implicit concession that if we found error, it would not be harmless.

We do not address the defendant’s identification argument because it is unlikely to arise in a new trial.

The State has not argued in its brief that any error in the trial court’s admitting the evidence at issue was harmless.

To make this showing, the affiant need only present the magistrate with *152 sufficient facts and circumstances to establish a “substantial likelihood” that the evidence or contraband sought will be found in the place to be searched.

Rule 404(b) typically arises where the State seeks to introduce evidence of prior bad acts of a defendant, rather than those of a witness.

Compare State v. Kirsch, 139 N.H. 647, 653, 662 A.2d 937, 942 (1995) (sexual assault) with State v. Newcomb, 140 N.H. 72, 74, *576 663 A.2d 613, 615 (1995) (murder) and State v. Richardson, 138 N.H. 162, 165, 635 A.2d 1361, 1364 (1993) (simple assault, theft, criminal threatening).

State v. Kirsch, 139 N.H. 647, 653, 662 A.2d 937, 942 (1995) (emphasis added).

Other bad acts evidence “is only admissible if relevant for a purpose other than to prove the defendant’s character or disposition, if there is clear proof the defendant committed the other acts, and if the prejudice to the defendant does not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.” State v. Kirsch, 139 N.H. 647, 653, 662 A.2d 937, 942 (1995).

Evidence of other bad acts is only admissible “if relevant for a purpose other than to prove the *828 defendant’s character or disposition, if there is clear proof the defendant committed the other acts, and if the prejudice to the defendant does not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.” State v. Kirsch, 139 N.H. 647, 653, 662 A.2d 937, 942 (1995).

Evidence of other bad acts is admissible under this rule only “if relevant for a purpose other than to prove the defendant’s character or disposition, if there is clear proof the defendant committed the other acts, and if the prejudice to the defendant does not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.” State v. Kirsch, 139 N.H. 647, 653, 662 A.2d 937, 942 (1995).

To be relevant as evidence of the defendant’s plan, “other bad acts must be constituent parts of some overall scheme.” State v. Kirsch, 139 N.H. 647, 655, 662 A.2d 937, 943 (1995).

Evidence of other bad acts is only admissible if relevant for a purpose other than to prove the defendant’s character or disposition, if there is clear proof the defendant committed the other acts, and if the prejudice to the defendant does not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.

“Evidence of other bad acts is only admissible if relevant for a purpose other than to prove the defendant’s character or disposition, if there is clear proof the defendant committed the other acts, and if the prejudice to the defendant does not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.” State v. Kirsch, 139 N.H. 647, 654, 662 A.2d 937, 942 (1995).