Cited by

Flanagan v. Prudhomme, 138 N.H. 561, 574 (1994) (“An unrestricted right-of-way is subject to a determination of reasonable use.” (emphasis added)); Soukup v. Brooks, 159 N.H. 9, 19 (2009) (where the deed created a “perpetual right and easement for all purposes,” the use of the right of way to benefit other property may not be prohibited “unless such use

We base our interpretation upon the trial court’s findings of fact to which we will defer if they are supported by the evidence and not legally erroneous, Crowley, 162 N.H. at 771-72, particularly when they are aided by the trial court’s view of the property, Flanagan v. Prudhomme, 138 N.H. 561, 574 (1994).

We review a trial court’s application of law to facts de novo, but we defer to a trial court’s findings of fact, when those findings are supported by evidence in the record, Blagbrough, 155 N.H. at 33, and particularly when, as in this case, they were based upon the trial court’s view of the property, see Flanagan v. Prudhomme, 138 N.H. 561, 574 (1994).

Flanagan v. Prudhomme, 138 N.H. 561, 574 (1994) (noting that even “[a]n unrestricted right-of-way is subject to a determination of reasonable use”); Delaney v. Gurrieri, 122 N.H. 819, 821 (1982) (“The doctrine of reasonable use applies even to a right-of-way expressly conveyed, without restrictions.”).

e right to pass over the respondent’s driveway and backyard whenever “the weather or some other emergency doesn’t provide the [petitioner] reasonable access to the rear of his property.” 6 Although the trial court has equitable authority to relocate a right-of-way in order to remedy an obstruction by the servient estate holder, see Flanagan v. Prudhomme, 138 N.H. 561, 573-74 (1994), here the trial court did not simply relocate the right-of-way to the respondent’s driveway; it imposed an ill-defi

If, however, the language of the deed is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intentions and the circumstances surrounding the conveyance may be used to clarify its terms.

If, however, the language of the deed is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intentions and the circumstances surrounding the conveyance may be used to clarify its terms.

Flanagan v. Prudhomme, 138 N.H. 561, 575-76 (1994) (holding that defendants failed to carry burden of proof to show that plaintiffs failed to mitigate damages when, among other things, they offered no evidence contradicting the plaintiffs’ evidence).

To establish an easement by prescription, the claimant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, twenty years of adverse, continuous and uninterrupted use of the land.

The interpretation of deeds is a question of law, ultimately to be resolved by this court.

The interpretation of deeds in a quiet title dispute is a question of law, ultimately to be resolved by this court.

If the language of the deed is clear and unambiguous, we will interpret the intended meaning from the deed itself without resort to extrinsic evidence.

“A deed is patently ambiguous when the language in the deed does not provide sufficient information to adequately describe the conveyance without *280 reference to extrinsic evidence.” Flanagan v. Prudhomme, 138 N.H. 561, 566 (1994).

Bonardi v. Kazmirchuk, 146 N.H. 640, 642 (2001); Flanagan v. Prudhomme, 138 N.H. 561, 572 (1994).

A subsequent grantee’s interpretation of language in a deed, however, has no bearing upon our interpretation, which focuses upon the intention of the parties at the time of the conveyance.

In order to obtain title by adverse possession, the adverse possessor must prove, by a balance of probabilities, twenty years of adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted use of the land claimed so as to give notice to the owner that an adverse claim is being made.

Cutter, 126 N.H. at 843-44; see Flanagan v. Prudhomme, 138 N.H. 561, 577 (1994).

“The interpretation of a deeded right of way is ultimately a question of law for this court to decide by determining the intention of the parties at the time of the deed in light of surrounding circumstances.” Flanagan v. Prudkomme, 138 N.H. 561, 573 (1994).

Flanagan v. Prudhomme, 138 N.H. 561, 566 (1994); Quality Discount Market Corp. v. Laconia Planning Bd., 132 N.H. 734, 740 (1990).

In addition to recognizing the economic loss doctrine, we have determined that a plaintiff has a general duty to mitigate damages.

We will not overturn the factual findings of the trial court, particularly when aided by a view of the property in question, when they are supported by the evidence.

F & R may not recover damages that could have been avoided through reasonable efforts or expenditures.

It is well established that a party seeking damages occasioned by the fault of another must take all reasonable steps to lessen his or her resultant loss.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF Property § 4.1, at 496-97; Flanagan v. Prudhomme, 138 N.H. 561, 573 (1994); Lussier v. N.E.

“To prevail on appeal, the [respondent] must show that the trial court’s determination of the disputed boundar[y] was unsupported by the evidence or was erroneous as a matter of law.” Flanagan v. Prudhomme, 138 N.H. 561, 565 (1994).

“If the language of the deed is clear and unambiguous, we will interpret the intended meaning from the deed itself without resort to extrinsic evidence.” Flanagan v. Prudhomme, 138 N.H. 561, 573, 644 A.2d 51, 60 (1994).

“The interpretation of deeds in a quiet title dispute is ultimately to be resolved by this court.” Flanagan v. Prudhomme, 138 N.H. 561, 565, 644 A.2d 51, 55 (1994).

The interpretation of deeds in a quiet title dispute is a question of law, which we review de novo.

In New Hampshire, “[a]n award of attorney’s fees is the exception rather than the rule and requires statutory authorization, an agreement between the parties, or an established exception.” Flanagan v. Prudhomme, 138 N.H. 561, 576, 644 A.2d 51, 62 (1994) (quotation and citation omitted).

denied, 503 U.S. 960 (1992), a court has the power to grant fees where there is “statutory authorization, an agreement between the parties, or an established exception.” Flanagan v. Prudhomme, 138 N.H. 561, 576, 644 A.2d 51, 62 (1994).

We will not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it is clearly erroneous.

Because “no person should be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit,” Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 690, 377 A.2d 617, 619 (1977), “[a]n award of attorney’s fees is the exception rather than the rule,” Flanagan v. Prudhomme, 138 N.H. 561, 576, 644 A.2d 51, 62 (1994).

We may disturb a trial court’s determination of admissibility if it is clearly erroneous.