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The court concluded that the defendant’s testimony was “not credible.” By contrast, the court found the detectives’ testimony to be “much more consistent, cohesive, and credible.” “We will not overturn the credibility ruling of the factfinder, who is in the best position to make such a determination.” State v. Seymour, 140 N.H. 736, 748 (1996) (quotation omitted).

n live testimony, in violation of his rights under the State and Federal Constitutions; (2) permitting an FBI agent to testify that the defendant’s account may have been untruthful; (3) permitting the State to introduce a new opinion from the medical examiner during the trial; (4) failing to instruct the jury that it must determine the “predominating cause” of death, pursuant to State v. Seymour, 140 N.H. 736 (1996); (5) failing to instruct the jury that the solicitation variant of capital murde

“the law of causation — i.e., the rules that define when a defendant’s conduct will be deemed to have ‘caused’ a particular result for purposes of the criminal law — applies to all offenses that require proof of causation, from first-degree murder down to the most minor misdemeanor.” Rogers v. State, 232 P.3d 1226, 1235 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010); see also Lamprey, 149 N.H. at 366; State v. Seymour, 140 N.H. 736, 746 (1996); State v. Soucy, 139 N.H. 349, 353 (1995) (“Causation is an element of the c

We analyzed the instructions in light of our previous holding in State v. Seymour, 140 N.H. 736, 746 (1996), that “a legal cause is the cause without which the event would not have occurred, and the predominating cause, a substantial factor from which the event follows as a natural, direct and immediate consequence.” Lamprey, 149 N.H. at 367.

Accordingly, to the extent the jury had any question about the defendant’s mere presence at the scene, the court’s instruction adequately conveyed the jury’s obligation to acquit if the State did not prove some active participation by the defendant.

that the Defendant possessed the material with the intent to sell or give it to somebody.” ‘We evaluate a claim that the trial court refused to answer a jury question in language requested by the defendant in the context of the entire charge and all of the evidence.” State v. Seymour, 140 N.H. 736, 746, *190 cert.

See, e.g., State v. Seymour, 140 N.H. 736, 739, 749, cert.

First, she argues that the language provided by the trial court failed to instruct the jury on legal causation in accordance with State v. Seymour, 140 N.H. 736, 746, cert.

Whether an instruction is necessary in a particular case, however, is an issue reserved to the trial court’s sound discretion.

law under the New Hampshire Constitution because the jury charge, as given, unfairly emphasized J.K’s testimony and implied “that a lesser burden applied to [J.K.’s] testimony than to Ms. Cook’s.” “A *742 jury must be instructed adequately and accurately on the relevant law, and whether or not a particular instruction is necessary is left to the trial court’s sound discretion.” State v. Seymour, 140 N.H. 736, 744, cert.

*664 To successfully assert a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must first show that counsel’s representation was constitutionally deficient and, second, that counsel’s deficient performance actually prejudiced the outcome of the case.

A defendant has no constitutional right to present irrelevant evidence, see Opinion of the Justices (Certain Evidence in Sexual Assault Cases), 140 N.H. 22, 24-25 (1995), and no right under Part I, Article 15 of the State Constitution to introduce evidence that will have little effect other than to confuse the issues or confound the jury, for such evidence is not competent, favorable proof.

We evaluate a claim that the trial court refused to answer a jury question in the language requested by the defendant in the context of the entire charge and all of the evidence.

We will first address the defendant’s claim under the State Constitution, see State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (1983), and will engage in a separate federal analysis only if federal law is more favorable.

To successfully assert a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s representation was constitutionally deficient and actually prejudiced the outcome of the case.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to present evidence of the degree of force used by the defendant to prove that he acted recklessly.

that the deficient performance resulted in actual prejudice such that there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent counsel’s deficient performance.

State v. Seymour, 140 N.H. 736, 740-41, 673 A.2d 786, 790-91, cert.denied, 117 S. Ct. 146 -47 (1996).

VI, XIV Because the Federal Constitution provides no greater protection than the State counterpart in this area, see State v. Weber, 137 N.H. 193, 196-97, 624 A.2d 967, 969 (1993), we do not engage in a separate federal analysis, see.State v. Seymour, 140 N.H. 736, 742, 673 A.2d 786, 791, cert.

ective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show deficient performance by trial counsel, in that counsel made such egregious errors that [he or she] failed to function as the counsel [that the State Constitution guarantees], and that the deficient performance resulted in actual prejudice such that there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent counsel’s deficient performance.

We first address the defendant’s claim under the State Constitution, see State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (1983), and will engage in a separate federal analysis only if federal law is more favorable to the defendant, cf. State v. Seymour, 140 N.H. 736, 742, 673 A.2d 786, 791, cert.

“A jury must be instructed adequately and accurately on the relevant law, and whether or not a particular instruction is necessary is left to the trial court’s sound discretion.” State v. Seymour, 140 N.H. 736, 744, 673 A.2d 786, 793 (1996).

Although the challenged evidence was undoubtedly prejudicial, as is all incriminating evidence, we cannot say that its prejudicial effect substantially outweighed its probative value.

We analyze the defendant’s due process claim under our State Constitution, State v. Seymour, 140 N.H. 736, 742, 673 A.2d 786, 791, cert.

“We decide this issue under the State Constitution, which provides at least as much protection as its federal counterpart.” State v. Seymour, 140 N.H. 736, 747, 673 A.2d 786, 794, cert.

We review the trial court’s answer to a jury inquiry in the context of the court’s entire charge, see State v. Seymour, 140 N.H. 736, 746, 673 A.2d 786, 794, cert.

Therefore, because the probative value of this evidence was not substantially outweighed by its potentially prejudicial nature, cf. State v. Seymour, 140 N.H. 736, 743, 673 A.2d 786, 793 (1996) (gruesome color photographs and videotape of murder crime scene were prejudicial, but nonetheless probative value was not substantially outweighed by the prejudice), we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence.