Cited by

The question is not whether we would have found differently, but rather, whether a reasonable person could have found as the trial judge did based upon the same evidence.

Barrows v. Boles, 141 N.H. 382, 390 (1996) (an ordinary breach of contract claim does not present an occasion for the remedies under the CPA); State v. Sideris, 157 N.H. 258, 262 (2008) (whether the defendant’s conduct was, in fact, unfair or deceptive in violation of the CPA, as opposed to an ordinary breach of contract, was a matter for the factf

that the Devenports obtain legal counsel, attempting to negotiate price, not explaining the meaning of the language contained in the draft agreement, threatening and attempting to enforce an option agreement, and pursuing a contentious litigation strategy would not “raise an eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and tumble of the world of commerce.” George, 162 N.H. at 129; see Barrows v. Boles, 141 N.H. 382, 390 (1996) (“‘[S]elfish bargaining and business dealings will not be enough to justify

Barrows v. Boles, 141 N.H. 382, 396-97 (1996) (brackets, citations, and quotations omitted).

Barrows v. Boles, 141 N.H. 382, 397 (1996) (affirming trial court’s denial of motions for reconsideration that “simply reiterated the arguments made at trial”).

Barrows v. Boles, 141 N.H. 382, 388 (1996) (‘Whether conduct is a material breach is a question for the trier of fact to determine from the facts and circumstances of the case.” (quotation and brackets omitted)).

She relies upon Barrows v. Boles, 141 N.H. 382, 389 (1996), for the proposition that “every agreement contains an implied covenant that each of the parties will deal in good faith and deal fairly with the other,” and that “[f]air dealing may include giving the opposing party fair notice and an opportunity to cure any significant objections before being held liable

“The trial court’s findings of fact and rulings of law will be upheld unless they lack evidentiary support or constitute clear error of law.” Barrows v. Boles, 141 N.H. 382, 389 (1996) (quotation omitted).

‘Whether conduct is a material breach is a question for the trier of fact to determine from the facts and circumstances of the case.” Barrows v. Boles, 141 N.H. 382, 388 (1996) (quotation and brackets omitted).

“[S]elfish bargaining and business dealings will not be enough to justify a claim for damages under the Consumer Protection Act.” Barrows v. Boles, 141 N.H. 382, 390 (1996) (quotation omitted).

We will uphold the trial court’s factual findings and rulings of law unless they lack evidentiary support or constitute a clear error of law.

Hobert, 155 N.H. at 402; see Barrows v. Boles, 141 N.H. 382, 390 (1996).

In determining which commercial actions, not specifically delineated, are covered by the act, we have employed the “rascality” test.

Barrows v. Boles, 141 N.H. 382, 396-97 (1996) (brackets, citations, and quotations omitted); see also Rancourt v. Town of Barnstead, 129 N.H. 45, 50 (1986) (“The credibility and weight to be given to a witness’ testimony is a question of fact for the trial court.

Rule 804(b)(1) creates a hearsay exception for the prior testimony of an unavailable witness when the witness gave that testimony at another hearing or deposition.

We have recognized that the general provision of the CPA is broadly worded, and not all conduct in the course of trade or commerce falls within its scope.

Appeal of Hooker, 142 N.H. 40, 47 (1997); Barrows v. Boles, 141 N.H. 382, 396-97 (1996).

In the past, we have noted the difficulty in determining which commercial actions are covered by the Act.

Because he makes only passing reference in his brief to his federal constitutional claim, we deem it waived and review only his State constitutional claim.

The court ruled that: (1) the plaintiff could not bring a private cause of action under RSA chapter 417 because there had not first been a finding of a violation or a cease and desist order by the insurance commissioner; (2) the plaintiff’s consumer protection claim failed because the defendant’s alleged unfair conduct did not meet the “rascality” test of Barrows v. Boles, 141 N.H. 382 (1996); and (3) the plaintiff could not recover for bad faith breach of insurance contract because the court fo

any unfair or deceptive act or practice in the *635 conduct of any trade or commerce within this state.” The parties agree that in order for conduct to run afoul of the statute, it “must attain a level of rascality that would raise an eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and tumble of the world of commerce.” Barrows v. Boles, 141 N.H. 382, 390, 687 A.2d 979, 986 (1996) (quotation omitted).

We will uphold a trial court’s decision on a motion for reconsideration absent an abuse of discretion.” Barrows v. Boles, 141 N.H. 382, 397, 687 A.2d 979, 990-91 (1996) (citation and quotations omitted).

Furthermore, this question was not raised in the plaintiff’s motion for a voluntary nonsuit or in its motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s order and is not properly before us for consideration.