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“The existence of a contract between parties may constitute a relation sufficient to impose a duty to exercise reasonable care.” Simpson v. Calivas, 139 N.H. 1, 4 (1994).

The trial court observed that this court has recognized that an attorney owes a duty of care to an intended beneficiary of a will to draft the will non-negligently.

We have held that a property owner may testify as to the value of his own property.

A duty of care “arises out of a relation between the parties and the [need for] protection against reasonably foreseeable harm.” Simpson v. Calivas, 139 N.H. 1, 4 (1994) (quotation omitted).

We have applied this principle to attorneys, Simpson v. Cativas, 139 N.H. 1, 4-5 (1994) (“an attorney who drafts a testator’s will owes a duty of reasonable care to intended beneficiaries”), and insurance investigators, Morvay v. Hanover Ins.

The remaining issues concern events that took place at trial; we will address those issues that are likely to arise on remand.

of Adj., Town of Newbury, 121 N.H. 226, 229 (1981); Simpson v. Calivas, 139 N.H. 1, 13 (1994), and since the result is the same regardless of whether the trial court chose to apply the safe harbor because it found bad faith intent or because it misapprehended the ACPA statutory scheme, our analysis of the trial court’s application of the safe harbor provision will assume a finding of bad faith inten

For collateral estoppel to apply, “the issue subject to estoppel must be identical in each action, the first action must have resolved the issue finally on the *16 merits, and the party to be estopped must have appeared in the first action, or have been in privity with someone who did.” Simpson v. Calivas, 139 N.H. 1, 7 (1994) (quotation omitted).

In Simpson v. Calivas, 139 N.H. 1, 4 (1994), we recognized an exception to the privity requirement with respect to a will beneficiary and held that an attorney who drafts a testator’s will owes a duty to the beneficiaries to draft the will non-negligently.

In general, the concept of duty arises out of the relationship between the parties and protection against reasonably foreseeable harm.

Simpson v. Cativas, 139 N.H. 1, 3-7 (1994); MacMillan v. Scheffy, 147 N.H. 362, 364 (2001).

Scheffy contends that in directing a verdict against him, the trial court erroneously extended the holding of Simpson v. Calivas, 139 N.H. 1, 4 (1994).

Therefore, we look to other jurisdictions to guide us in our determination.

See, e.g., Simpson v. Calivas, 139 N.H. 1, 5-6, 650 A.2d 318, 322 (1994) (duty of attorney drafting will to third party beneficiaries); Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 122 N.H. 898, 903-04, 451 A.2d 1308, 1312 (1982) (duty of accountants to those relying on their work, regardless of privity).

Simpson v. Calivas, 139 N.H. 1, 7, 650 A.2d 318, 323 (1994) (quotation and citations omitted).

In order to recover, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant’s negligent act or negligent failure to act caused or contributed to cause the plaintiff’s damages.

We have long held attorneys owe a duty of reasonable care to their clients, and more recently have recognized such a duty toward intended will beneficiaries.

“The elements of collateral estoppel are well-established: the issue subject to estoppel must be identical in each action, the first action must have resolved the issue finally on the merits, and the party to be estopped must have appeared in the first action, or have been in privity with someone who did so.” Simpson v. Calivas, 139 N.H. 1, 7, 650 A.2d 318, 323 (1994) (quotation omitted).

Because our decision on this issue requires remand to the trial court, we will address the defendant’s alternative grounds for precluding the plaintiff’s action.

When the probate court interprets a will, its task “is a limited one: to determine the intent of the testator as expressed in the language of the will.” Simpson v. Calivas, 139 N.H. 1, 8, 650 A.2d 318, 323-24 (1994) (emphasis omitted).