Cited by

In re Eduardo L., 136 N.H. 678, 689 (1993); State v. McMinn, 141 N.H. 636, 642 (1997) (the general rule in this jurisdiction is that a contemporaneous and specific objection is required to preserve an issue for appellate review).

RSA 169- B:24; In re Eduardo L., 136 N.H. 678, 683 (1993).

4 The standard for acceptance of certification by the superior court, and our scope of review, are identical and of a limited nature.

generally In re Eduardo L., 136 N.H. 678, 686 (1993) (explaining three-part due process inquiry and holding that “a defendant does not have a general due process right to meaningful cross-examination in a juvenile certification 4 hearing”).

However, that the private interest is “critical” is not, by itself, dispositive.

In re Eduardo L., 136 N.H. 678, 686 (1993); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).

*552 In re Eduardo L., 136 N.H. 678, 686 (1993) (quotations omitted); see Petition of Bagley, 128 N.H. 275, 285 (1986).

whether its decision is supported by the evidence and not erroneous as a matter of law.” In re Eduardo L., 136 N.H. 678, 684 (1993) (quotation omitted).

As is our settled practice, we will analyze the due process issue in this case first under our own constitution, relying upon federal case law only for guidance.

We recognize its desire to avoid expanded hearings for sentencing and to minimize “fiscal and administrative burdens on the court, the prosecution, and law enforcement officials.” In re Eduardo L., 136 N.H. 678, 688 (1993).

See, e.g., In re Eduardo L., 136 N.H. 678, 687, 621 A.2d 923, 930 (1993).

“The decision to transfer a juvenile to superior court for adult prosecution falls within the district court’s sound discretion.” In re Eduardo L., 136 N.H. 678, 683, 621 A.2d 923, 927 (1993).

In re Eduardo L., 136 N.H. 678, 687, 621 A.2d 923, 929 (1993) (observing that interest at stake in juvenile certification hearings is not as compelling as in pretrial detention hearings).

We have also recognized that the purpose of certification “hearings is not adjudicatory, but rather what we termed ‘investigatory/ A juvenile certification hearing is not determinative of guilt or innocence, or of a right to liberty, but designed to identify the appropriate procedure to achieve a fair resolution of guilt or innocence and any punishment flowing therefrom.” In re Eduardo L., 136 N.H. 678, 687, 621 A.2d 923, 929 (1993) (citation omitted).

Because part I, article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution provides at least as much protection to criminal defendants in this area as does the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution, see State v. O’Leary, 128 N.H. 661, 664-66, 517 A.2d 1174, 1177 (1986); In re Eduardo L., 136 N.H. 678, 685, 621 A.2d 923, 928 (1993), we need not undertake a separate federal analysis.

In re Eduardo L., 136 N.H. 678, 689, 621 A.2d 923, 931 (1993) (“To preserve an objection for appeal, a party must make a contemporaneous objection.

Because we have previously determined that part I, article 15 is at least as protective of individual liberties as the fourteenth amendment, e.g., In re Eduardo L., 136 N.H. 678, 685, 621 A.2d 923, 928 (1993), we need not conduct a separate due process analysis under the Federal Constitution.