Cited by

Clipper Affiliates v. Checovich, 138 N.H. 271, 274 (1994) (quotation and emphasis omitted).

We have held that abuse of process comprises two essential elements: an ulterior purpose and a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding.

The tort of abuse of process requires proof that the defendant utilized a legal process “primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed.” Clipper Affiliates v. Checovich, 138 N.H. 271, 276 (1994) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 682, at 474 (1977)).

The tort of abuse of process “comprises two essential elements: an ulterior purpose and a wilful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding.” Clipper Affiliates v. Checovich, 138 N.H. 271, 276 (1994).

The general rule in this state is that each party to a lawsuit is responsible for payment of its own attorney’s fees.

“Damages in tort must be proven with as much certainty as the nature of the tort and the circumstances permit.” Clipper Affiliates v. Checovich, 138 N.H. 271, 276 (1994) (quotation omitted).

When reviewing a motion to dismiss at the close of the plaintiff’s case in a jury-waived trial, we will not set aside the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous and will not reverse the dismissal unless it is inconsistent with the findings or contrary to law.

Shelton cites Clipper Affiliates v. Checovich, 138 N.H. 271 (1994), in support of her argument that a party who is neither forced to litigate nor subjected to litigation should bear the burden of paying his or her own attorney’s fees.

Clipper Affiliates v. Checovich, 138 N.H. 271, 278 (1994) (brackets, citation,.

Clipper Affiliates v. Checovich, 138 N.H. 271, 274 (1994) (in reviewing a motion to dismiss at the close of the plaintiff’s case in a jury-waived trial “we will not set aside the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous and will not reverse the dismissal unless it is inconsistent with the findings or contrary to law”).

Courts in other jurisdictions have ruled that because a promise by one party to a contract to indemnify the other party for attorney’s fees incurred in litigation between the two parties is contrary to the general rule that parties are responsible for their own legal fees, see Clipper Affiliates v. Checovich, 138 N.H. 271, 277 (1994), the court should not infer a party’s intention to waive the benefit of the general rule “unless the intention to do *110 so is unmistakably clear from the language

“The general rule in this State is that each party to a lawsuit is responsible for payment of his or her own attorney’s fees.” Clipper Affiliates v. Checovich, 138 N.H. 271, 277 (1994) (emphasis omitted).

“In tort, one to whom another has tortiously caused harm is entitled to compensatory damages for the harm if, but only if, he establishes by proof the extent of the harm and the amount of money representing adequate compensation with as much certainty as the nature of the tort and the circumstances permit.” Clipper Affiliates v. Checovich, 138 N.H. 271, 274 (1994) (quotation and brackets omitted).

st trial and the post-trial litigation as neither the plaintiff nor his attorney should suffer from the acts of defendant and her counsel.” *794 An award of attorney’s fees “must be grounded upon statutory authorization, an agreement between the parties, or an established exception to the rule that each party is responsible for paying his or her own counsel fees.” Clipper Affiliates v. Checovich, 138 N.H. 271, 278 (1994) (quotation and brackets omitted).

must be grounded upon statutory authorization, an agreement between the parties, or an established exception to the rule that each party is responsible for paying his or her own counsel fees.” Clipper Affiliates v. Checovich, 138 N.H. 271, 278 (1994) (quotation and brackets omitted).

must be grounded upon statutory authorization, an agreement between the parties, or an established exception to the rule that each party is responsible for paying his or her own counsel fees.” Clipper Affiliates v. Checovich, 138 N.H. 271, 278 (1994) (quotation and brackets omitted).

We conclude that notice to the intervenors was sufficient because, by definition intervenors have a direct and apparent interest in the subject matter of the litigation, Clipper Affiliates v. Checovich, 138 N.H. 271, 277 (1994), and by virtue of their status, they were parties to the case.

*450 Decisions by the trial court to admit evidence are not disturbed on appeal “unless they are clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of the complaining party’s case.” Clipper Affiliates v. Checovich, 138 N.H. 271, 275, 638 A.2d 791, 794 (1994).

[or to] those who are forced to litigate against an opponent whose position is patently unreasonable.” Clipper Affiliates v. Checovich, 138 N.H. 271, 278, 638 A.2d 791, 796 (1994) (quotations and citations omitted).

[and we] will not disturb the trial court’s rulings unless they are clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of the complaining party’s case.” Clipper Affiliates v. Checovich, 138 N.H. 271, 275, 638 A.2d 791, 794 (1994) (citation omitted).

“Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court,” Clipper Affiliates v. Checovich, 138 N.H. 271, 275, 638 A.2d 791, 794 (1994), and “[t]he defendant has the burden to demonstrate that the trial court’s discretionary ruling is clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case,” State v. Bouchard, 138 N.H. 581, 583, 643 A.2d 963, 965 (1994).

“We will not overturn the trial court’s decision concerning attorney’s fees absent an abuse of discretion.” Clipper Affiliates v. Checovich, 138 N.H. 271, 278, 638 A.2d 791, 796 (1994).

No liability exists, however, “where a party has done nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even though with ulterior intentions.” Clipper Affiliates v. Checovich, 138 N.H. 271, 277, 638 A.2d 791, 795 (1994).

must be grounded upon statutory authorization, an agreement between the parties, or an established exception to the rule that each party is responsible for paying his or her own counsel fees.” Clipper Affiliates v. Checovich, 138 N.H. 271, 278, 638 A.2d 791, 796 (1994) (quotation and brackets omitted).

Clipper Affiliates v. Checovich, 138 N.H. 271, 278, 638 A.2d 791, 796 (1994) (citations, quotations, and brackets omitted).

must be grounded upon statutory authorization, an agreement between the parties, or an established exception to the rule that each party is responsible for paying his or her own counsel fees.” Clipper Affiliates v. Checovich, 138 N.H. 271, 278, 638 A.2d 791, 796 (1994) (quotation and brackets omitted).

Next, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s evidentiary rulings.