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[¶2] We conclude that Part I, Article 2-b of the State Constitution abrogates our holding in State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 413 (1993), which applied Gagne to records held by private organizations.

State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 408-09 (1993) (concluding that the expert’s methodology was not reliable, in part because the evaluative techniques that the expert used to formulate her opinion did not utilize standardized tests, and the results of the evaluations did not produce “quantifiable results that could then be compared to a standardized n

od that [she] had,” and her “lack of relationship with her birth mother.” We conclude that the prosecutor’s remarks created neither prejudice, as required by the curative admissibility doctrine, nor a misleading advantage, as required by the specific contradiction doctrine, because the jury is allowed to draw its own conclusions as to whether a victim’s behavior is probative of prior sexual abuse.

As a result, 3 We agree with the State that our prior cases neither prohibit fact witnesses from testifying about the behavioral characteristics and changes of a child sexual abuse victim nor require an expert for such testimony to be admissible.

We have observed that a child’s delayed disclosure of abuse “may be puzzling or appear counterintuitive” to lay observers.

cause it could help the jury determine “whether the victim’s late disclosure was a result of 2 fabricated allegations.” We have considered “the behavioral characteristics commonly found in child abuse victims” an appropriate area of expert testimony to preempt or rebut any inferences that a child complainant lacks credibility in a child sexual abuse case.

The trial court found that, even though Gladstone did not explicitly opine that the complainant had been sexually assaulted, her testimony ran afoul of our general prohibition against offering expert testimony “to prove that a particular child has been sexually abused.” State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 412 (1993).

State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 412 (1993) (holding that “expert testimony may not be offered to prove that a particular child has been sexually abused.

For instance, in State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402 (1993), we held that, “in the event of a retrial,” the trial court “must conduct an in camera review” of notes made during counseling sessions by a privately employed psychologist “should the defendant establish a reasonable probability that the [notes] contain information relevant and material to his defense.” Cresse

The trial court explained that “Fusco’s testimony is the type of expert testimony that the Supreme Court has held may not be offered to prove that a particular child has been sexually abused.” See State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 412 (1993).

State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 412 (1993) (holding that “State may offer expert testimony explaining the [counterintuitive] behavioral characteristics commonly found in child abuse victims to rebut any inferences that a child victim witness is lying”); State v. MacRae, 141 N.H. 106, 110 (1996) (expert testimony that allows a jury to draw inference

702, so long as the testimony “rise[s] to a threshold level of reliability,” State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 405 (1993).

The State may introduce evidence to explain a sexual assault victim’s behavior.

Ill Although we reverse the defendant’s convictions on his first claim of error, we address his other claims in the interest of judicial economy to the extent they are likely to arise upon retrial.

We have recognized that a layperson is not capable of making such observations because “a child’s delayed disclosure of abuse, inconsistent statements about abuse, and recantation of statements about abuse, may be puzzling or appear counterintuitive to lay observers when they consider the suffering endured by a child who is continually being abused.” State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 411 (1993).

Thus, expert testimony “must rise to a threshold level of reliability to be admissible.” *614 State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 405 (1993).

The defendant knew at his second trial that the scope of his expert’s testimony would be limited, because we do not allow expert psychological testimony to prove whether a child has been sexually abused and we do not allow expert psychological testimony concerning the veracity of a child’s testimony about being abused.

Expert testimony “must be reliable to be admissible,” State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 404-05 (1993), and “the determination of whether particular expert testimony is reliable and admissible rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Hammond, 144 N.H. 401, 406 (1999) (brackets and quotation omitted).

*408 In State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402 (1993), we held that the State may offer expert testimony regarding child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome to “explain[] the behavioral characteristics commonly found in child abuse victims to preempt or rebut any inferences that a child victim witness is lying.” Id.

mpletely different case with different facts and different injuries.” In denying the motion, the court noted “that it did not ‘rely’ on prior experience with plaintiff’s expert in reaching its conclusion, but only cited to that experience to buttress the compelling need to insure that expert testimony presented to the jury is competent and reliable in accordance with the rule of State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402 (1993).” We accept the trial court’s explanation that it only referenced its prior expe

We have recognized in recent years that victims of sexual assaults may not immediately disclose them.

Because the parties do not contend.that the Daubert standard, see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), should govern our analysis, we do not decide whether the Frye test has been superseded by the adoption of New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 702, see, e.g., State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 405, 628 A.2d 696, 698 (1993).

That a five-year-old child’s story concerning an alleged sexual assault varied somewhat over the course of one year concerning one aspect of the assault did not demonstrate clearly and convincingly that the allegations were false.

State v. Gagne, 136 N.H. 101, 105-06, 612 A.2d 899, 901 (1992); State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 413, 628 A.2d 696, 703-04 (1993).

We have previously discussed child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome.

State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 410, 628 A.2d 696, 701 (1993) (considering difficulty of effective cross-examination of expert witness where *246 several interpretive steps made inside head of expert); Comment, Repression, Memory, and Suggestibility: A Call for Limitations on the Admissibility of Repressed Memory Testimony in Sexual Abuse Trials

The testimony was not “lengthy, comprehensive, [or] directly linked to a determination of the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 411, 628 A.2d 696, 702 (1993).

Both defendants moved to dismiss the prosecutions, asserting that the complainants’ testimony would not be admissible at trial under State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 628 A.2d 696 (1993), New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 702, State v. Coolidge, 109 N.H. 403, 260 A.2d 547 (1969), rev’d on other grounds, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), or Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

In the interest of judicial economy, we will address the defendant’s remaining arguments to the extent they are likely to arise at a new trial.

The court, relying upon our decision in State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 628 A.2d 696 (1993), ruled that the State would be permitted to call its expert to explain the general effects of family violence and why victims of such violence might later minimize the offending conduct or recant their accounts of abuse.

The defendant argues that the trial court, over objection, allowed the State to admit testimony from the expert to prove that the victim’s allegations were true, in violation of our ruling in State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 628 A.2d 696 (1993).

The determination of whether particular expert testimony is reliable and admissible rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.

Accordingly, we need not decide whether the adoption of the New Hampshire Rules of Evidence superseded the Frye test, see Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794; State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 405, 628 A.2d 696, 698 (1993), and we decide this case under the Daubert standard and Rule 702.

Brock, C.J. The respondent, Jon D., appeals the Superior Court’s (Dalianis, J.) finding pursuant to RSA chapter 169-C that he sexually abused his daughter, Gina D. Relying on our recent decision in State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 628 A.2d 696 (1993), he argues that the superior court erroneously based its finding on insufficient evidence because the expert psychological testimony concluding that Gina had been sexually abused was unreliable.

Although we reverse because of this error, we will address the defendant’s remaining arguments on appeal, as they may arise again in a new trial.

(quotation omitted); see also Dwire v. Sullivan, 138 N.H. 428, 431, — A.2d —, — (1994); cf. State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 411, 628 A.2d 696, 702 (1993).

We note that, on remand, the plaintiff still carries the burden to substantiate her allegations of abuse and, if challenged, to validate the phenomenon of memory repression itself and the admissibility of evidence flowing therefrom.

In State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 628 A.2d 696 (1993), decided after the trial in this case took place, we held precisely this type of evidence to be inadmissible to prove sexual abuse.

If the social worker’s challenged testimony were interpreted to be his opinion, based on his professional evaluation, as to whether Jessie had been sexually abused, it would not be sufficiently reliable *259 to be admissible.

I would automatically report it to the Division of Children and Youth Services that this had to be investigated, and this child, in my mind, would raise serious question if this child needed to be protected.” Dr. Bollerud’s testimony is a clear example of the type of unreliable evidence that we have held should be excluded from criminal trials.

We reverse the remaining conviction in light of our opinion in State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 628 A.2d 696 (1993), on the ground that the testimony of the State’s expert witness was improperly admitted at trial.