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make a recommendation as to whether further board action should be taken on the allegations in question.” (emphasis added)); cf. Petition of Grimm, 138 N.H. 42, 54 (1993) (“[T]he board may reject uncontradicted opinion testimony that its own expertise renders unpersuasive.”).

Petition of Grimm, 138 N.H. 42, 46 (1993) (due process requirements binding administrative procedures are quite different from those binding judicial procedures).

We agree with the State that Petition of Grimm, 138 N.H. 42, 55 (1993), and Appeal of Beyer, 122 N.H. 934, 939-40 (1982), provide that expert testimony is not necessary in all cases to establish a violation of the applicable standard of care.

The plaintiffs mistakenly rely upon Petition of Grimm, 138 N.H. 42, 46-47 (1993), and Petition of Smith, 139 N.H. 299, 302-05 (1994), to support their argument.

The board should apply the presumption that the HSB, serving in an adjudicatory capacity, is “presumed to be of conscience and capable of reaching a just and fair result.” Petition of Grimm, 138 N.H. 42, 52 (1993).

RSA 541-A:33, VI (1997); see also Petition of Grimm, 138 N.H. 42, 54 (1993).

Petition of Bagley, 128 N.H. 275, 288 (1986); Petition of Grimm, 138 N.H. 42, 46-47 (1993).

The burden is upon the party alleging bias to present *442 sufficient evidence to rebut this presumption.” Petition of Grimm, 138 N.H. 42, 52 (1993) (citations omitted).

The State argues that our opinion in Petition of Grimm, 138 N.H. 42, 635 A.2d 456 (1993), “established the exclusive method of challenging the bias or prejudice of an administrative decision-maker.” In Petition of Grimm, we rejected an argument that a party was entitled to voir dire members of an administrative board to ascertain potential bias.

Petition of Grimm, 138 N.H. 42, 52, 635 A.2d 456, 463 (1993) (party alleging bias in agency officials has burden to present sufficient evidence).

Petition of Grimm, 138 N.H. 42, 55, 635 A.2d 456, 465 (1993) (medical board did not need expert testimony to determine whether doctor’s conduct fell below professional standard of care).

See, e.g., Appeal of Grimm, 141 N.H. 719, 720, 692 A.2d 508, 510 (1997) (Grimm II); Petition of Grimm, 138 N.H. 42, 46, 635 A.2d 456, 459 (1993) (Grimm I).

Regarding equal protection, we held in Petition of Grimm, 138 N.H. 42, 51, 635 A.2d 456, 462 (1993), that the State may “treat professions differently according to the needs of the public in relation to each.” We have found a need to protect the public from the few members of the legal profession who might engage in criminal conduct.

Petition of Grimm, 138 N.H. 42, 49, 635 A.2d 456, 461 (1993); see Valenzuela-Gonzalez v. U.S. D.C.

Petition of Grimm, 138 N.H. 42, 635 A.2d 456 (1993) (Grimm I).

“[L]aw of the land” means due process of law.

This case is thus unlike Petition of Grimm, 138 N.H. 42, 46-48, 635 A.2d 456, 459-60 (1993), in which the failure of board members to attend a hearing rendered them unable to resolve a crucial credibility contest.

This provision has been recognized as vesting discipline of the legal profession in the supreme court.

Our decision in Petition of Grimm, 138 N.H. 42, 635 A.2d 456 (1993), governs this case.

We hold that under the facts of this case, the board did not abuse its discretion by refusing to hold the record open for the submission of an additional report.

Petition of Grimm, 138 N.H. 42, 50, 635 A.2d 456, 461 (1993); see RSA 330-A:l (Supp. 1993).