Cited by

Cheshire Medical Center v. Holbrook, 140 N.H. 187, 189 (1995); see also LeClair v. LeClair, 137 N.H. 213, 222 (1993) (“We apply the strict scrutiny test.

“The court’s powers in custody, maintenance, and education of children in divorce and separation eases are conferred entirely by statute.” LeClair v. LeClair, 137 N.H. 213, 217 (1993) (superseded by statute on other grounds).

As the right to use and enjoy property is an important substantive right, we use our intermediate scrutiny test to review equal protection challenges to zoning ordinances that infringe upon this right.

In another context we have stated, “Under the rational basis analysis, the party challenging [specific] legislation has the burden to prove that whatever classification is promulgated is arbitrary or without some reasonable justification.” LeClair v. LeClair, 137 N.H. 213, 223 (1993) (quotation omitted) (applying rational basis review to RSA chapter 458).

We recognize that there is an overlap between our rational basis and intermediate or middle-tier scrutiny tests in that both tests include the terms “reasonable” and “arbitrary.” Compare, e.g., LeClair v. LeClair, 137 N.H. 213, 223 (1993), with Gould, 126 N.H. at 408-09.

LeClair v. LeClair, 137 N.H. 213, 222 (1993); see In re Sandra II., 150 N.H. 634, 638 (2004).

LeClair v. LeClair, 137 N.H. 213, 217-18 (1993) (superseded by statute).

LeClair v. LeClair, 137 N.H. 213, 218-20 (1993); In the Matter of Breault & Breault, 149 N.H. 359, 362 (2003).

Estate of Robitaille v. N.H. Dep’t of Rev. Admin., 149 N.H. 595, 596 (2003); LeClair v. LeClair, 137 N.H. 213, 221-22 (1993).

Accordingly, the party challenging the court’s order has the burden of showing that the order was improper and unfair.

In considering an equal protection challenge under our State Constitution, we must first determine the appropriate standard of review by examining the purpose and scope of the State-created classification and the individual rights affected.

id.; see also LeClair v. LeClair, 137 N.H. 213, 220 (1993) (court has jurisdiction to originate child support order after child turned eighteen and graduated from high school).

As the petitioners are not similarly situated with the officials in the aforementioned cases, no equal protection problem is involved.

LeClair v. LeClair, 137 N.H. 213, 218-19 (1993); see also French v. French, 117 N.H. 696, 699 (1977) (interpreting RSA 458:17 to allow court to order divorced parents to pay for reasonable college expenses of their adult children); RSA 458:17,:20 (1992).

“The first question in an equal protection analysis is whether the State action in question treats similarly situated persons differently.” LeClair v. LeClair, 137 N.H. 213, 222 (1993) (quotation omitted).

Because the Federal Constitution provides no greater protection in the area of equal protection, we need not undertake a separate federal analysis.

“The first question in an equal protection analysis is whether the State action in question treats similarly situated persons differently.” LeClair v. LeClair, 137 N.H. 213, 222, 624 A.2d 1350, 1355 (1993) (quotation omitted).

The standard used to answer this question depends on the rights affected by the statute.

Because the Federal Constitution provides no greater protection in this area, we need not conduct a separate federal analysis.

In order to withstand scrutiny under this provision, a common law rule that distributes benefits or burdens on the basis of gender must be necessary to serve a compelling State interest.

We will review this claim under the New Hampshire Constitution, LeClair v. LeClair, 137 N.H. 213, 221-22, 624 A.2d 1350, 1355 (1993), because the Federal Constitution offers no greater protection under its equal protection provisions.

Where applicable, reliance is grounded on the New Hampshire Constitution, part I, articles 1 and 2, because the provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provide no greater relief to the petitioners.

We begin an equal protection analysis by asking whether the legislation at issue treats similarly situated persons differently, LeClair v. LeClair, 137 N.H. 213, 222, 624 A.2d 1350, 1355 (1993), and thereby creates a classification requiring equal protection scrutiny.