Cited by

Ct. R. 7(1)(C) (stating that untimely post-decision motion does not stay running of 30-day appeal period 2 unless trial court waives untimeliness within appeal period, and that absent a waiver of untimeliness within appeal period, the trial court’s ruling on untimely post-decision motion does not extend appeal period); Germain v. Germain, 137 N.H. 82, 84-85 (1993) (limiting appeal to decision denying untimely motion to reconsider and dismissing appeal as to earlier decision on the merits, becaus

Germain v. Germain, 137 N.H. 82, 84 (1993) (“Generally, when a trial court issues an order that does not conclude the proceedings before it, for example, by deciding some but not all issues in the proceedings.

Germain v. Germain, 137 N.H. 82, 84 (1993) (holding that, when a trial court bifurcates a divorce and decides some, but not all, issues, that decision is a final “decision on the merits” under Supreme Court Rules 3 and 7).

Spiegel v. Trustees of Tufts College, 843 F.2d 38, 44-45 (1st Cir. 1988); cf. Germain v. Germain, 137 N.H. 82, 84 (1993) (“[W]e do not intend to encourage bifurcation, and caution that discretion to bifurcate should be exercised sparingly.”).

Germain v. Germain, 137 N.H. 82, 84-85 (1993); In re Estate of Porter, 159 N.H. 212, 214 (2009).

Germain v. Germain, 137 N.H. 82, 84 (1993) (explaining that, in general, when a trial court issues an order that does not conclude the proceeding before it, by, for example, entering judgment with respect to some, but not all parties to the action, we consider any appeal from such an order to be interlocutory).

“[M]erely accepting and ruling upon a late motion for reconsideration is not the equivalent of waiving the untimeliness within the appeal period.” Germain v. Germain, 137 N.H. 82, 85 (1993) (quotation and brackets omitted).

Ct. R. 5(4); Germain v. Germain, 137 N.H. 82, 84-85 (1993) (treating appeal from denial of untimely motion for reconsideration as timely appeal only as to the denial of the motion, and not as to the earlier decision on the merits); In re Estate of Porter, 159 N.H. 212, 214 (2009) (citing Germain for same proposition).

The respondent asserts that our holding in Germain v. Germain, 137 N.H. 82 (1993), supports his position.

The December 2013 orders resolved, finally and on the merits, the issue of the date of valuation of the husband’s defined contribution retirement accounts, which is why we treated the wife’s prior appeal as an appeal from a final decision on the merits, and not as an interlocutory appeal.

We note that the default entered against Matthew did not become a final and appealable “decision on the merits” for purposes of Rule 3 until the trial court had entered judgment against Carin, thereby finally resolving the claims against all parties to the action.

Germain v. Germain, 137 N.H. 82, 84 (1993) (when trial court issues order entering judgment with respect to some but not all parties to the action, or deciding some but not all issues or claims, supreme court considers appeal from such order to be interlocutory).

Germain v. Germain, 137 N.H. 82, 84 (1993) (stating order is interlocutory when it does not decide all issues in proceeding).

Brian A. Gillis, as Trustee of the Gillis Family Irrevocable Trust of 2012 v. Randall S. Lawson & a., No. 2015-0487 (N.H. September 30, 2015) (accepting this case as an appeal from the court’s July 7, 2015 order on post-trial motions); see also Germain v. Germain, 137 N.H. 82, 84-85 (1993) (ruling that, because appellant had not timely filed a motion for reconsideration 2 from the order on the merits, the appeal was timely only as to the order denying the untimely motion, and not as to the order

Germain n Germain, 137 N.H. 82, 84-85 (1993) (while untimely motion for reconsideration did not stay the running of the appeal period under Supreme Court Rule 7, appeal was timely as to the order denying the untimely motion).

We confronted a situation similar to the present one in Germain v. Germain, 137 N.H. 82 (1993).

we consider any appeal from such an order to be interlocutory____” Germain v. Germain, 137 N.H. 82, 84 (1993).

we consider any appeal from such an order to be interlocutory____” Germain v. Germain, 137 N.H. 82, 84 (1993); see also Putnam Lumber Co. v. Eddie Nash & Sons, 141 N.H. 670, 671 (1997) (holding that court order that decides some, but not all, of the issues before the court is not a final order for collateral estoppel purposes).

This case is distinguishable from Germain v. Germain, 137 N.H. 82, 84, 623 A.2d 760, 761 (1993), where we held that in a bifurcated divorce proceeding an order on the divorce decree and property settlement constituted a final decision on the merits even though child custody and permanent support issues remained undetermined.

Also, the trial court specifically rested its denial, in part, on the motion’s untimeliness.

Germain v. Germain, 137 N.H. 82, 84, 623 A.2d 760, 761 (1993); Petition of Donovan d/b/a Donovan Group Home, 137 N.H. 78, 81, 623 A.2d 1322, 1324 (1993).

Under these circumstances, we conclude that the district court order was an interlocutory, not a final, order.

Germain v. Germain, 137 N.H. 82, 84, 623 A.2d 760, 761 (1993) (where judgment entered with respect to some but not all parties, appeal of order is generally interlocutory); Petition of Donovan d/b/a Donovan Group Home, 137 N.H. 78, 81, 623 A.2d 1322, 1324 (1993) (res judicata improper where no final judgment because appeal pending).

Germain v. Germain, 137 N.H. 82, 84, 623 A.2d 760, 761 (1993); see generally J. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 13.1 (1985) (analyzing the final judgment rule and its exceptions).