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“When the State must prove the value of property in order to bring a crime within the ambit of a particular criminal statute, any evidence from which the trier of fact can reasonably infer value is admissible.” State v. Paris, 137 N.H. 322, 327 (1993) (quotation omitted).

ource “because a lot of yards don’t want to take the chance of breaking the glass when they cut it out.” Although RSA 634:2 does not define pecuniary loss, we have held that when the State must prove the value of property to bring the loss “within the ambit of a particular criminal statute, any evidence from which the trier of fact can reasonably infer value is admissible.” State v. Paris, 137 N.H. 322, 327 (1993) (quotation omitted).

The State may rely upon circumstantial evidence.

We will therefore uphold a trial court’s decision admitting an expert opinion unless we find its ruling was untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of the defendant’s case.

The discovery of truth in criminal proceedings should not suffer by an overly technical application of a scheduling order or the rules of court.

The trial court’s decision to admit expert testimony will be upheld absent a clear abuse of discretion.

“The trial court has wide discretion in admitting or excluding an expert opinion, and we will not reverse its decision unless we find a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Paris, 137 N.H. 322, 332, 627 A.2d 582, 588 (1993) (quotation omitted).

*432 Most recently, in State v. Paris, 137 N.H. 322, 627 A.2d 582 (1993), we considered a defendant’s claim that his convictions for felony criminal mischief and felonious use of a firearm violated double jeopardy where both offenses involved statutory enhancements.

“The party offering the witness as an expert bears the burden of establishing the witness’s qualifications.” State v. Paris, 137 N.H. 322, 331-32, 627 A.2d 582, 588 (1993).

failed to demonstrate how the disputed testimony [would] negate intent, rather than simply presenting a confusing theory of defense similar to justification or excuse.” “The trial court has wide discretion in admitting or excluding an expert opinion, and we will not reverse its decision unless we find a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Paris, 137 N.H. 322, 332, 627 A.2d 582, 588 (1993) (quotation omitted).

Although State v. Paris, 137 N.H. 322, 627 A.2d 582 (1993), involved a violation of RSA 634:2, 11(a), we noted that the legislative history indicates that ‘“[t]he grading of this offense is based upon considerations of seriousness similar to those *46 that govern theft offenses, namely, the amount of property lost, and upon the seriousness as measured by

The legislature thus plainly intended that a single transaction could give rise to multiple, distinct offenses, cf. State v. Paris, 137 N.H. 322, 335, 627 A.2d 582, 590 (1993), and the evidence here supported guilty verdicts on both.

We have held “that use of the term ‘should’ in a Wentworth charge provides the equivalent of a jury nullification instruction, in that the jurors are notified that they may acquit the defendant even if the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offenses charged.” State v. Paris, 137 N.H. 322, 333, 627 A.2d 582, 589 (1993) (emphasis added and quotation omitted).