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State v. Lemieux, 136 N.H. 329, 331 (1992) (concluding that testimony was “merely cumulative” because “even if the testimony at issue had been excluded, the jury would nonetheless have had the witness’s opinion before it”).

State v. Lemieux, 136 N.H. 329, 331- 32 (1992) (explaining that “the evidence most damaging to the defendant was the victim’s description, in vivid detail, of the various sexual acts that the defendant forced her to perform on a regular basis”); see also State v. Anctil, 134 N.H. 623, 626 (1991) (reasoning that “the testimony that was most damning

The factors that we have considered in assessing whether an error did not affect the verdict include, but are not limited to: (1) the strength of the State’s case, see State v. Vandebogart, 139 N.H. 145, 158 (1994); (2) whether the admitted or excluded evidence is cumulative or inconsequential in relation to the strength of the State’s case, see State v. Lemieux, 136 N.H. 329, 331-32 (1992); (3) the frequency of the error, see State v. Bujnowski, 130 N.H. 1, 5-6 (1987); (4) the presence or absen

He was also charged with one count of AFSA, specifically “intentionally touching the [victim’s] genitalia with his hand over her clothing.” Here, as in State v. Gonzalez, 150 N.H. 74, 79 (2003), and State v. Lemieux, 136 N.H. 329, 331-32 (1992), the evidence most damaging to the defendant was the victim’s detailed description of the assaults.

Smith, 141 N.H. at 279; State v. Lemieux, 136 N.H. 329,331 (1992).

Here, as in State v. Lemieux, 136 N.H. 329, 331-32 (1992), “the evidence most damaging to the defendant was the victim’s description, in vivid detail, of the various sexual acts.” The victim, who was seventeen years old by the time of trial, was able to remember the details of assaults that occurred up to nine years earlier.

Nor did he comment upon the ultimate issue of whether the improper touching occurred, thereby making one witness more or less credible than the other.

Thus, even if the testimony at issue had been excluded, the jury would nonetheless have had the victim’s testimony that she recognized the defendant when he came into her room.

In this case, the probative strength of the alternative evidence presented by the State was considerable.

We need not decide whether the court erred because this evidence was merely cumulative and therefore harmless.

“The evaluation of whether this standard has been achieved involves *158 consideration of the alternative evidence presented at trial,” id., and of the character of the inadmissible evidence itself, see State v. Lemieux, 136 N.H. 329, 331, 615 A.2d 635, 636 (1992).

While this other evidence is to be considered in a harmless error analysis, see State v. Lemieux, 136 N.H. 329, 331-32, 615 A.2d 635, 636 (1992), “[i]t is not a question whether the evidence, apart from that erroneously admitted, would support a finding of guilt, but whether it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the inadmissible evidence did not affect the verdict.” State v. Skidmore, 138 N.H. 201, 203-04, 636 A.2d 6

State v. Lemieux, 136 N.H. 329, 331, 615 A.2d 635, 636 (1992) (erroneous admission of hearsay harmless where merely cumulative).