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State v. Ayer, 136 N.H. 191, 194 (1992) (“In general, however, ‘purpose’ corresponds loosely with the common-law concept of specific intent, while ‘knowledge’ corresponds loosely with the concept of general intent.” (quotation omitted)).

ee RSA 626:2, II, III (2007), and is defined as follows: “A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when his conscious object is to cause the result or engage in the conduct that comprises the element.” RSA 626:2, 11(a); see State v. Holmes, 154 N.H. 723, 725 (2007) (“the Criminal Code generally uses the term ‘purposely’ in place of specific intent”); State v. Ayer, 136 N.H. 191, 194 (1992) (“specific intent commonly refers to a special *584 mental element above an

Rather, we apply our well-settled precedent: “Where a specific mental state is not provided for the offense, we read RSA 626:2,1, as requiring proof of a culpable mental state which is appropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the policy considerations for punishing the conduct in question.” State v. Ayer, 136 N.H. 191, 193 (1992) (quotations, brackets and ellipsis omitted).

The State had the burden to prove that the defendant (1) sexually penetrated R.T., (2) when she was under the age of thirteen, and (3) that he acted knowingly.

To establish liability for conspiracy, the State must demonstrate that the defendant had a true purpose to effect the criminal result.

We have stated that “[r]ape [is] the common law counterpart to aggravated felonious sexual assault.” State v. Ayer, 136 N.H. 191, 194 (1992).

Jackson, 141 N.H. at 154-55; see also State v. Ayer, 136 N.H. 191, 195 (1992).

Therefore, “the State bore the burden of proving that the defendant knowingly committed each element of the offenses charged.” Bassett, 139 N.H. at 500, 659 A.2d at 896; see State v. Ayer, 136 N.H. 191, 195, 612 A.2d 923, 925 (1992).

The question, rather, is “whether a reasonable person in the circumstances would have understood that the victim did not consent.” State v. Ayer, 136 N.H. 191, 196, 612 A.2d 923, 926 (1992).

We look to the common law origins of a crime in deciding the requisite, mens rea when the statute is silent.

State v. Ayer, 136 N.H. 191, 193, 612 A.2d 923, 924 (1992); RSA 626:2, I (1986) (“A person is guilty of...

When a defendant charged with sexual assault claims that the alleged victim consented, the State’s burden is not to prove the defendant’s subjective state of mind but “whether a reasonable person in the circumstances would have understood that the victim did not consent.” State v. Ayer, 136 N.H. 191, 196, 612 A.2d 923, 926 (1992).

The requisite intent for the crime of aggravated felonious sexual assault is that the defendant acted knowingly.

Compare RSA 632-A:2 with RSA 632-A:4; see State v. Ayer, 136 N.H. 191, 193-94, 612 A.2d 923, 924-25 (1992) (knowing mental state is element of aggravated felonious sexual assault).

2d 358, 365, 655 P.2d 697, 700 (1982); cf. State v. Ayer, 136 N.H. 191, 195-96, 612 A.2d 923, 926 (1992) (where defendant claims defense of consent, State need not prove that defendant actually knew the victim was not consenting).

State v. Ayer, 136 N.H. 191, 612 A.2d 923 *331 (1992) (requisite mental state for aggravated felonious sexual assault is “knowingly”).

The defendant first challenges the aggravated felonious sexual assault indictment that alleged that he acted “knowingly” rather than “purposely.” We have recently decided this issue against him, holding in State v. Ayer, 136 N.H. 191, 612 A.2d 923 (1992), that for a conviction of aggravated felonious sexual assault the State need only prove that the defendant acted knowingly.