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Citing State v. Greene, 137 N.H. 126 (1993), the defendant asserts that the jury instructions “failed adequately to communicate” that the jury “had to agree unanimously on a particular kick.” [¶18] “A person is guilty of simple assault if he.

State v. Greene, 137 N.H. 126, 128 (1993) (explaining that the elements of knowing simple assault are twofold: “the culpable mental state of knowingly and the proscribed conduct of unprivileged physical contact”).

Insofar as the defendant relies upon State v. Greene, 137 N.H. 126 (1993), as support for his argument, we note that it is questionable whether that case can be squared with our later unanimity cases.

Relying upon State v. Greene, 137 N.H. 126 (1993), the defendant maintains that the error in failing to so instruct the jury was plain.

In support of his argument, the defendant relies solely upon State v. Greene, 137 N.H. 126 (1993).

State v. Greene, 137 N.H. 126, 128 (1993) (“The New Hampshire Criminal Code requires jury unanimity with respect to the presence of the elements of offenses in criminal cases as charged.”).

In State v. Greene, 137 N.H. 126 (1993), dealing with the requirement of unanimity for a petit jury, we distinguished between the means of committing a crime and the elements requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jurors must be unanimous about what constitutes the essential culpable act committed by the defendant and prohibited by the statute.

Jury unanimity as guaranteed to each criminal defendant in this State is a matter of constitutional and statutory law.

*592 In order to convict the defendant of a criminal offense, a jury-must unanimously agree that the defendant committed the material elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

He asserts that under State v. Greene, 137 N.H. 126 (1993), “shard or shards of glass” and “sharp-bladed object” are discrete factual predicates that provide alternative bases for establishing the element of deadly weapon, and that therefore all jurors must agree on which object was used.

Assuming, without deciding, that the State was required to prove the “force” allegation to secure a conviction on the false imprisonment charge, see State v. Greene, 137 N.H. 126, 129, 623 A.2d 1342, 1344 (1993), we conclude that as charged the false imprisonment indictment is sufficiently distinct in fact and law from the physical force indictment such that the dual indictments were properly presented to the jury for its deliberation.

A general unanimity instruction is usually sufficient to ensure a unanimous jury verdict.

Thus, the State alternatively relied on eight discrete factual predicates to prove the “overt act” element.

Because each of those indictments, according to the defendant, contained alternative factual predicates for finding elements of the charged offenses, he argues that the trial court’s failure to give such instructions violated his right under Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution and RSA 625:10 (1996) to a unanimous jury verdict with respect to each element.