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The petitioner is currently serving a life-without-parole sentence for her conviction as an accomplice to first degree murder.

The trial court’s determination of the impartiality of the jurors selected, essentially a question of demeanor and credibility, is entitled to special deference.

Superior Court Civil Rule 36(d)(3) provides that, “[a]fter a witness has been dismissed from the stand, the witness cannot be recalled without permission of the court.” We review the trial court’s decision not to allow a witness to be recalled under our unsustainable discretion standard.

State v. Smart, 136 N.H. 639, 651 (1993) (“[T]he defendant’s satisfaction with [his] jury at the time of selection may be reflected in the fact that [he] did not employ all of the peremptory challenges available to [him], a fact relevant to a claimed lack of an impartial jury.” (citation omitted)).

Part I, Article 17 provides the same level of protection as the Federal Constitution...” Id.; see State v. Smart, 136 N.H. 639, 646 (1993) (change of venue principles are the same under the State and Federal Constitutions).

State v. Smart, 136 N.H. 639, 646 (1993); Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 509 (1971); see also N.H. CONST, pt.

primary reliance on the judgment of the trial court makes good sense.” State v. Smart, 136 N.H. 639, 653 (quotation and brackets omitted), cert.

denied, 498 U.S. 849 (1990); see also State v. Smart, 136 N.H. 639, 658 (“Our system of justice is premised upon the belief that jurors will follow the court’s instructions.”) cert.

The affidavit did not say that defense counsel believed that there was a meritorious issue; thus the failure to renew the motion demonstrates defense counsel’s apparent conclusion that he had obtained an impartial jury.

t, Sleeper’s argument that the trial court erred by not immediately conducting an individual voir dire of each juror would have been raised in such a motion, since the critical issue here was whether the juror’s comments following entry of the verdict raised a colorable claim that the jury had improperly shifted the burden of proof and whether the trial court appropriately investigated the matter.

State v. Smart, 136 N.H. 639, 650 *719 (1993) (it is presumed that jury follows court’s instructions), cert.

Likewise, allowing cameras or other electronic media into a courtroom would not automatically infringe upon a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial unless that defendant could show either actual or inherent prejudice from the electronic media presence.

It instead instructed the jury that “[t]he race or ethnicity of any person is not before you and is not material to any determinations that you have to make in this matter.” There is no evidence that the trial court’s exercise of discretion cannot be sustained, as *390 “[o]ur system of justice is premised upon the belief that jurors will follow the court’s instructions.” State v. Smart, 136 N.H. 639, 650 (quotations omitted), cert denied, 510 U.S. 917 (1993).

“[O]ur system of justice is premised upon the belief that jurors will follow the court’s instructions.” State v. Smart, 136 N.H. 639, 658, cert.

“Once a defendant has been permitted a threshold level of inquiry, however, the constitutional standard is satisfied, and the judge’s limiting of cross-examination is measured against an [unsustainable exercise of discretion] standard.” State v. Smart, 136 N.H. 639, 667-68 (citation omitted), cert.

Consequently, we reject the defendant’s argument that the cumulative effect of the prior allegations demonstrated their falsity.

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to quash the subpoena.

We presume that juries follow their instructions.

Based on the evidence introduced at trial viewed most favorably to the State, see State v. Smart, 136 N.H. 639, 643, 622 A.2d 1197, 1200, cert.

*226 Based upon the evidence at trial viewed most favorably to the State, see State v. Smart, 136 N.H. 639, 643, 622 A.2d 1197, 1200, cert.

See, e.g., State v. Smart, 136 N.H. 639, 658, 622 A.2d 1197, 1204-05, cert.

Because the petitioner failed to raise this issue again either before or during the evidentiary hearing, it is not preserved for our review.

We do not expect the trial court, in this context, to reopen sua sponte a motion it had previously denied.

As we stated in State v. Smart, 136 N.H. 639, 664, 622 A.2d 1197, 1213, cert.

While there may be some instances in which curative instructions would be inadequate as a matter of law, cf. State v. Sammataro, 135 N.H. 579, 582, 607 A.2d 135, 136 (1992), we base our review on the familiar presumption that jurors follow the trial court’s instructions.

We assume that jurors follow properly crafted instructions.

This argument not having been raised below, it will not be considered on appeal.

Therefore, we will not address it.

A defendant’s State constitutional right to a jury trial incorporates the right to a jury of twelve, see Hewitt, 128 N.H. at 558, 517 A.2d at 820, and the right to a fair and impartial jury, see State v. Smart, 136 N.H. 639, 646, 622 A.2d 1197, 1202, cert.

Because his double jeopardy claim was not raised below, we do not consider it, see State v. Smart, 136 N.H. 639, 661, 622 A.2d 1197, 1212, cert.

Because we believe the principles are the same, see State v. Smart, 136 N.H. 639, 646, 622 A.2d 1197, 1202, cert.

We have previously declined to adopt a per se rule under our State Constitution that “once an individual is represented by counsel on the matter on which the State seeks to question [him or] her, no waiver of counsel is valid unless made in the presence of counsel.” State v. Smart, 136 N.H. 639, 664, 622 A.2d 1197, 1213, cert.

e the trial court did, however, firmly instruct the jury how it should consider the photographs: “[Y]ou must concentrate your efforts and determinations on the questions that are really before you, not the treatment alleged to have been committed by someone else but the treatment alleged to have been committed by this defendant In this vein, we note that juries are presumed to follow instructions.

State v. Smart, 136 N.H. 639, 653, 622 A.2d 1197, 1203 (trial court’s determination of juror impartiality entitled to special deference), cert.

see State v. Smart, 136 N.H. 639, 650, 622 A.2d 1197, 1204 (1993) (our system of justice premised on belief that jurors follow court’s instructions).

We will therefore not consider it here.