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To the extent the respondent argues that the trial court violated the procedural requirements of Gosselin v. Gosselin, 136 N.H. 350, 353 (1992), by not making a determination as to the reasonableness of the fees the petitioner incurred, we note that (1) the trial court, in its final decree, expressly awarded the petitioner 57% of the reasonable attorney’s fees she incurred, and (2) the respondent, in his motion for reconsideration, did not argue t

The trial court has broad discretion over the admission of evidence in divorce cases and is not bound by the rules of evidence.

Gosselin v. Gosselin, 136 N.H. 350, 353-54 (1992); see also In the Matter of Hampers & Hampers, 154 N.H. 275, 290 (2006).

The petitioner further asserts that “[t]here was no hearing with regard to the reasonableness of the requested fees or any evidence to support the amount claimed or what it was used for.” Essentially, the petitioner contends that the trial court failed to comply with Gosselin v. Gosselin, 136 N.H. 350, 353 (1992), as is required for attorney’s fee awards made under the divorce exception.

The trial court is not bound by the rules of evidence in divorce cases.

However, we vacated the award of attorney’s fees that the wife had incurred, but the husband had not yet paid, and remanded to the trial court to determine the reasonableness of those fees pursuant to the procedure we set out in Gosselin v. Gosselin, 136 N.H. 350, 353-54 (1992).

On appeal, the husband argued that the award of attorney’s fees should be vacated either because the court did not offer a rationale for it or because the trial court failed to make a determination as to the reasonableness of the fees as required by Gosselin v. Gosselin, 136 N.H. 350, 353 (1992).

Gosselin v. Gosselin, 136 N.H. 350 (1992).” In Gosselin, 136 N.H. at 353, we held that before a court may award attorney’s fees, it “must determine [the] reasonableness of the attorney’s fees and, in order to do so, must have some evidence of the services performed, the time involved and the fee arrangement.” The petitioner contends that the trial cou

In addition, “[t]he trial court has broad discretion over the admission of evidence in divorce cases and is not bound by the rules of evidence.” Gosselin v. Gosselin, 136 N.H. 350, 353 (1992).

We hold that a party seeking to enforce a general contract provision requiring the opposing party to pay attorney’s fees must introduce “some evidence of the services performed, the time involved and the fee arrangement,” Gosselin v. Gosselin, 136 N.H. 350, 353, 616 A.2d 1287, 1289 (1992), demonstrating that the amount claimed is reasonable.

Gosselin v. Gosselin, 136 N.H. 350, 352, 616 A.2d 1287, 1288 (1992) (amendment to pleadings generally allowed unless opponent can show incurable prejudice).

In accordance with our holding in Gosselin v. Gosselin, 136 N.H. 350, 353-54, 616 A.2d 1287, 1289 (1992), we vacate the award and remand for a new hearing on this issue.

Because the record does not reveal that the defendants objected to the jury verdict form at trial, we will not consider it here.

We allow “liberal amendment of pleadings unless the changes surprise the opposite party, introduce an entirely new cause of action, or call for substantially different evidence.” Clinical Lab Products, Inc., 121 N.H. at 991, 437 A.2d at 286 (citations omitted); see Gosselin v. Gosselin, 136 N.H. 350, 352, 616 A.2d 1287, 1288 (1992).

Gosselin v. Gosselin, 136 N.H. 350, 352-53, 616 A.2d 1287, 1288 (1992) (issues enlarged at trial and party deemed to have consented by way of participation and failure to object).