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When reviewing a finding of abuse or neglect, we will sustain the findings and rulings of the trial court unless they are unsupported by the evidence or tainted by error of law.

When reviewing a finding of abuse or neglect, we will sustain the findings and rulings of the trial court unless they are unsupported by the evidence or tainted by error of law.

Consequently, our task is not to determine whether we would have found differently; rather, we determine whether a reasonable person could have found as the trial judge did.” In re Thomas M., 141 N.H. 55, 57 (1996) (quoting In re Tracy M., 137 N.H. 119, 125 (1993)); accord In re Craig T., 144 N.H. 584, 585 (1999).

The Federal Constitution offers no greater protection than the State Constitution under these circumstances, see In re Tracy M., 137 N.H. 119, 122 (1993); Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32.

Petition of Preisendorfer, 143 N.H. 50, 53 (1998) (stating that asserted stigmatization from being placed upon a central registry of sex offenders was no greater than a professional interest for purpose of procedural due process); In re Tracy M., 137 N.H. 119, 124 (1993) (assuming that “liberty interest in...

Because the State Constitution is at least as protective of individual liberties in these circumstances as the Federal Constitution, see In re Tracy M., 137 N.H. 119, 122 (1993), we reach the same result under the Federal Constitution.

Because the State Constitution is at least as protective of individual liberties in these circumstances as the Federal Constitution, see In re Tracy M., 137 N.H. 119, 122 (1993), we reach the same result under the Federal Constitution.

“Many physical ailments might be treated with some degree of effectiveness by a doctor whom the patient did not trust, but a psychiatrist must have his patient’s confidence or he cannot help him.” In re Brenda H., 119 N.H. 382, 386 (1979) (quotation *665 omitted), superseded on other grounds as recognized by In re Tracy M., 137 N.H. 119, 123-24 (1993).

We conclude that this argument was not adequately briefed and, therefore, decline to address it.

Our case law supports disclosure of privileged and relevant medical records when: (1) a statute specifically authorizes disclosure, see In re Brenda H., 119 N.H. 382, 384-86 (1979) (superseded on other grounds as recognized by In re Tracy M., 137 N.H. 119 (1993)); (2) a sufficiently compelling countervailing consideration is identified, see Elwell, 132 N.H. *441 at 606; In re Kathleen M., 126 N.H. at 382, 385; or (3) disclosure is essential under the specific circumstances of the case, see In re

“Where it appears that an error did not affect the outcome below, or where the court can see from the entire record that no injury has been done, the judgment will not be disturbed.” In re Tracy M., 137 N.H. 119, 125-26 (1993) (quotation omitted).

Consequently, in balancing the private interest involved, we consider the interest of both the respondent and the child to determine what process is due.

“Where it appears that an error did not affect the outcome below, or where the court can see from the entire record that no injury has been done, the judgment will not be disturbed.” In re Tracy M., 137 N.H. 119, 125-26 (1993) (quotation omitted).

The due process requirements of Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution are at least as protective of individual liberties as the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, see, e.g., In re Tracy M., 137 N.H. 119, 122 (1993), and therefore we need not conduct a separate due process analysis under the Federal Constitution.

Because the factual findings made by the probate court were amply supported by the evidence presented at the termination hearing, independent of the social study, any alleged error associated with its admission was harmless.

Because the State Constitution is at least as protective of individual liberties in this area as the Federal Constitution, we need not conduct a separate federal inquiry.

Because the State Constitution is at least as protective of individual liberties as the Federal Constitution, we need not conduct a separate federal inquiry.

In re Tracy M., 137 N.H. 119, 125, 624 A.2d 963, 966 (1993) (citations and quotation omitted).

Because the State Constitution is at least as protective of individual liberties as the Federal Constitution, we need not conduct a separate federal inquiry.

*206 Furthermore, the State, in its role as parens patriae, has a significant interest in protecting the best interest of the child, see In re Tracy M., 137 N.H. 119, 124, 624 A.2d 993, 996 (1993), which requires terminating parental rights in certain instances.

In re Tracy M., 137 N.H. 119, 125, 624 A.2d 963, 966 (1993); Pendergast, 95 N.H. at 193-94, 60 A.2d at 124.

We proceed with our analysis based only upon the petitioner’s interest in his profession because it is significant and his other interest is no greater.

To determine whether a government action satisfies due process requirements, “we first decide whether the challenged procedure concerns a constitutionally protected interest, and if so, we then determine whether the procedure at issue afforded the requisite safeguards.” In re Tracy M., 137 N.H. 119, 122, 624 A.2d 963, 965 (1993).

The superior court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, see RSA 169-C:13 (1994); In re Tracy M., 137 N.H. 119, 124, 624 A.2d 963, 966 (1993), that the respondent neglected his children because of his incarceration, see RSA 169-C:3, XIX(c).

In re Tracy M., 137 N.H. 119, 122, 624 A.2d 963, 965 (1993); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979).

Because we find article 15 at least as protective of individual liberties as the fourteenth amendment, see In re Tracy M., 137 N.H. 119, 122, 624 A.2d 963, 965 (1993), we need not conduct a separate due process examination under the Federal Constitution and will cite federal law only to aid our analysis.

In re Kearsarge Regional School Dist., 138 N.H. 211, 214, 636 A.2d 1033, 1035 (1994); In re Tracy M., 137 N.H. 119, 125, 624 A.2d 963, 966 (1993).

Because federal law is not more favorable to the defendant in this case, see In re Tracy M., 137 N.H. 119, 122, 624 A.2d 963, 965 (1993); see also United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 1347, 1357 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.

A child’s and his or her family’s life may be seriously and permanently affected by the court’s determination in an abuse proceeding.