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Here, except for the effective date, the amendments are silent as to whether they should apply prospectively or retrospectively.

We will be “particularly sensitive to insure that every safeguard is observed.” State v. Johnson, 134 N.H. 570, 577 (1991); see Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 321 (1991) (meaningful appellate review plays a crucial role “in ensuring that the death penalty is not imposed arbitrarily or irrationally”).

Nevertheless, the State, citing State ex rel Fortin v. Harris, 109 N.H. 394 (1969), and State v. Johnson, 134 N.H. 570 (1991), argues against reading the statute “absolutely literally” where such a reading would be inconsistent with the statute’s purpose.

re would be ‘rare’ in a case such as this,” the defendant argues that she “has a state constitutional right to the appellate procedure in place at the time the crime was committed.” Although the State concedes that the facts of the present case mirror those that existed in McKenney, it argues that McKenney and Komisarek have been implicitly overruled by subsequent cases such as State v. Johnson, 134 N.H. 570 (1991), Petition of Hamel, 137 N.H. 488 (1993), State v. Hamel, 138 N.H. 392 (1994), Sta

with State v. Johnson, 134 N.H. 570, 573-74 (1991) (holding that statute that changed aggravating factors that court could consider in imposing sentence affected defendants’ substantive rights and could not apply retrospectively).

“We will not place a literal interpretation on a phrase when doing so removes it from the context of the whole.” State v. Johnson, 134 N.H. 570, 576 (1991).

Furthermore, “[w]e -will not place a literal interpretation on a phrase when doing so removes it from the context of the whole.” State v. Johnson, 134 N.H. 570, 576 (1991).

“On questions of statutory interpretation, this court is the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.” State v. Johnson, 134 N.H. 570, 575, 595 A.2d 498, 502 (1991) (quotations omitted).

“On questions of statutory interpretation, this court is the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.” State v. Johnson, 134 N.H. 570, 575, 595 A.2d 498, 502 (1991) (quotations omitted).

We presume that where a statute affects substantive rights, it was intended to apply prospectively only.

We begin a statutory analysis by considering the plain meaning of the statutes.

In matters of statutory interpretation, “this court is the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.” State v. Johnson, 134 N.H. 570, 575, 595 A.2d 498, 502 (1991) (quotation omitted).

*471 “On questions of statutory interpretation, this court is the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.” State v. Johnson, 134 N.H. 570, 575, 595 A.2d 498, 502 (1991) (quotation omitted).

This case turns on the meaning of “criminal.” “On questions of statutory interpretation, this court is the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.” State v. Johnson, 134 N.H. 570, 575, 595 A.2d 498, 502 (1991) (quotation omitted).

“[T]his court is the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute.” State v. Johnson, 134 N.H. 570, 575, 595 A.2d 498, 502 (1991) (quotation and citation omitted).

The defendant relies on State v. Johnson, 134 N.H. 570, 595 A.2d 498 (1991), in which we held that a statute that imposed the death penalty solely when the defendant exercised his right to a jury trial was unconstitutional.

When the legislature is silent as to whether a statute should apply prospectively or retrospectively, our interpretation turns on whether the statute affects the parties’ substantive or procedural rights.

Chapter 330-A, however, does contain a quorum requirement: RSA 330-A:7 states that “[f]our members shall constitute a quorum.” In determining legislative intent, we look to the language of the entire chapter.

We therefore rely on the plain meaning of the words and turn to the legislative history only if the language is ambiguous.

As a general rule, statutes are to be applied prospectively.

Further, such plain and unambiguous language is not subject to judicial modification.

Whereas the potential sentence is most material to the event of the crime, see State v. Johnson, 134 N.H. 570, 572-74, 595 A.2d 498, 500-01 (1991), the recommitment procedure is most material to the event of the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.