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[¶15] Similarly, we concluded in State v. Chase that being the “head of the household” was a sufficient position of authority under RSA 632-A:2, I(k).

See, e.g., State v. Chase, 135 N.H. 209, 212 (1991) (to prevail on claim of ineffective assistance, defendant must demonstrate both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that, but for those errors, reasonable probability exists that result of trial would have been different).

Crafts establishes that the word “result” is interchangeable with “verdict.” See id.; see also State v. Chase, 135 N.H. 209, 212-13 (1991) (noting the reason that the generic term “result” was chosen over “verdict” in the standard for ineffective assistance is because the standard for ineffective assistance, like the standard for a new trial, is “intended to apply to more than one type of proceeding”).

When we review the performance of trial counsel, we begin with a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the limits of reasonable practice^] bearing in mind the limitless variety of strategic and tactical decisions that counsel must make.” State v. Chase, 135 N.H. 209, 212, 600 A.2d 931, 933 (1991) (quotation and ellipsis omitted).

v. Town of Merrimack, 139 N.H. 253, 256, 651 A.2d 928, 930 (1994); see State v. Chase, 135 N.H. 209, 215, 600 A.2d 931, 935 (1991) (“We will not overturn the credibility ruling of the factfinder, who is in the best position to make such a determination.

The State Constitution is at least as protective as the Federal Constitution in this area.

We will not disturb the factual findings of the trial court “unless they are not supported by the evidence or are erroneous as a matter of law"McCabe v. Arcidy, 138 N.H. 20, 24, 635 A.2d 446, 449 (1993); see also State v. Chase, 135 N.H. 209, 215, 600 A.2d 931, 935 (1991).

at 152, 635 A.2d at 1359, means he must show a reasonable probability that he would have been acquitted.

Because the standard for attorney performance is the same under the New Hampshire and Federal Constitutions, see State v. Chase, 135 N.H. 209, 211, 600 A.2d 931, 933 (1991), we consider the defendant’s claim under the State Constitution, see id., using federal law only as an aid in our analysis.

Id.; see also State v. Chase, 135 N.H. 209, 212, 600 A.2d 931, 933 (1991).

The trial court had the opportunity to hear, *161 observe, and evaluate O’Brien’s testimony and found “the newly discovered evidence offered by O’Brien to be totally incredible.” We will not overturn the credibility ruling made by the fact finder.

“We will not overturn the credibility ruling of the factfinder, who is in the best position to make such a determination....” State v. Chase, 135 N.H. 209, 215, 600 A.2d 931, 935 (1991).

“[A] trier of fact is free to accept or reject an expert’s testimony, in whole or in part, when faced with conflicting expert testimony.” Bartlett Tree Experts Co. v. Johnson, 129 N.H. 703, 706, 532 A.2d 1373, 1374 (1987); see also State v. Chase, 135 N.H. 209, 215, 600 A.2d 931, 935 (1991) (“We will not overturn the credibility ruling of the factfinder, who is in the best position to make such a determination.