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though RSA 212:34 does not define “intentional act,” see RSA 212:34, I, V, both parties argue that we should interpret “intentional act” under RSA 212:34 in the same fashion as we did when construing the Workers’ Compensation Law: for a tort to be an “intentional tort” the tortfeasor must act with the knowledge that “his conduct [is] substantially certain to result in injury.” Thompson v. Forest, 136 N.H. 215, 220 (1992) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 870, at 280 (1979)).

Thompson v. Forest, 136 N.H. 215, 219 (1992) (“To constitute an intentional tort, the tortfeasor must have known that his conduct was substantially certain to result in injury.”).

Estabrook v. American Hoist & Derrick, Inc., 127 N.H. 162, 171, 498 A.2d 741 (1985) (quotation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Young v. Prevue Products, Inc., 130 N.H. 84, 88, 534 A.2d 714 (1987), and Thompson v. Forest, 136 N.H. 215, 219, 614 A.2d 1064 (1992); New York Cent.

Estabrook v. American Hoist & Derrick, Inc., 127 N.H. 162 (1985), overruled by Young v. Prevue Products, Inc., 130 N.H. 84 (1987); Thone v. Liberty Mutual Ins.

Nor are they sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, as a court considering such a motion “need not accept statements in the complaint which are merely conclusions of law.” Thompson v. Forest, 136 N.H. 215, 216 (1992) (quotation omitted).

When reviewing a decision of the trial court dismissing a cause of action for failure to state a claim, we assume all allegations in the plaintiffs’ pleadings to be true and construe all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.

The act was first enacted in 1911 “[i]n recognition of the burdens, delays, inadequate relief and unequal operation of law inherent in common law remedies.” Thompson v. Forest, 136 N.H. 215, 217, 614 A.2d 1064, 1066 (1992).

The workers’ compensation scheme is based on a “fundamental quid pro quo,” Thompson v. Forest, 136 N.H. 215, 219, 614 A.2d 1064, 1067 (1992), which is “the tort immunity conferred on the employer...

in the absence of provision of a satisfactory substitute.” Carson, 120 N.H. at 943, 424 A.2d at 838 (quotation and emphasis omitted); see also Petition of Abbott, 139 N.H. 412, 416-17, 658 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1995); Rooney v. Fireman’s Fund Ins.

Thompson v. Forest, 136 N.H. 215, 217-19, 614 A.2d 1064, 1066-67 (1992) (workers’ compensation).

In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, we assume the truth of the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s pleadings and construe all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to him.

Because this appeal comes to us on a denial of a motion to dismiss for either failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or preemption of that claim, we assume the truth of the facts as alleged in the plaintiff’s pleadings and construe all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

are reasonably susceptible of a construction that would *30 permit recovery.” Thompson v. Forest, 136 N.H. 215, 216, 614 A.2d 1064, 1065 (1992) (quotation omitted).

“The standard of review in considering a motion to dismiss is whether the allegations in the plaintiffs pleadings are reasonably susceptible of a construction that would permit recovery.” Thompson v. Forest, 136 N.H. 215, 216, 614 A.2d 1064, 1065 (1992) (quotation omitted).

tutory or common law rights extinguished under the statutes: “In recognition of the burdens, delays, inadequate relief and unequal operation of law inherent in common law remedies, the Workers’ Compensation Law was designed to substitute for unsatisfactory common law remedies in tort a liability without fault with limited compensation capable of ready and early determination.” Thompson v. Forest, 136 N.H. 215, 217, 614 A.2d 1064, 1066 (1992) (quotation omitted).

Our inquiry is driven by analysis of the fairness of the compensation scheme as a whole.” Thompson v. Forest, 136 N.H. 215, 218-19, 614 A.2d 1064, 1067 (1992), overruling Estabrook v. American Hoist & Derrick, Inc., 127 N.H. 162, 498 A.2d 741 (1985).