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At the heart of these cases is a concern about the unfairness of allowing the jury to hear evidence of other crimes committed by the defendant that are similar to that for which the defendant is on trial.

Compare Kerwin, 144 N.H. at 361 (holding that statement that “that man raped some girl” was highly prejudicial and warranted mistrial), and State v. Ayotte, 146 N.H. 544, 548 (2001) (holding that testimony about prior fire was similar to charged offense and warranted mistrial), with State v. Ellison, 135 N.H. 1, 5-6 (1991) (holding that a mistrial was not required in assault case where inadmissible testimony that the defendant previously fractured victim’s nose could be viewed as an accident and

The proper inquiry in this case, for determining whether the defendant was so substantially prejudiced that the remedy of mistrial was required, is whether the fact that the alleged prior acts were criminal in nature was unambiguously revealed to the jury.

Cf State v. Ellison, 135 N.H. 1, 6 (1991) (inadmissible testimony, introduced contrary to prior court order, did not entitle defendant to mistrial).

“To justify a mistrial, prejudicial testimony must be more than inadmissible, it must constitute an irreparable injustice that cannot be cured by jury instructions.” State v. Ellison, 135 N.H. 1, 4 (1991) (quotations omitted).

“Where the testimony is ambiguous, a defendant is not so substantially prejudiced that a mistrial is required.” State v. Ellison, 135 N.H. 1, 6 (1991).

As the trial court is in the best position to gauge any prejudicial effect the prosecutor’s closing remarks may have had on the jury, we review the trial court’s decision declining to give an instruction under an abuse of discretion standard.

In this context, when deciding whether a defendant suffered irreparable injustice, we examine whether the inadmissible testimony unambiguously conveyed to the jury that the defendant had committed an act which was criminal in nature.

Rather, introduction of the inadmissible evidence must make it unjust to allow the case to continue to a verdict.

The trial court is in the best position to determine what remedy will adequately correct the prejudice created by a prosecutor’s remarks, and absent an abuse of discretion, we will not overturn its decision.

State v. Ellison, 135 N.H. 1, 4, 599 A.2d 477, 479-80 (1991) (quotations and citations omitted); see, e.g., State v. Degre, 137 N.H. 512, 513-14, 629 A.2d 818, 819 (1993).

“Where the testimony is ambiguous, a defendant is not so substantially prejudiced that a mistrial is required.” State v. Ellison, 135 N.H. 1, 6, 599 A.2d 477, 480 (1991).

Hastings, 137 N.H. at 605, 631 A.2d at 529; State v. Michaud, 135 N.H. 723, 728, 610 A.2d 354, 357 (1992); State v. Ellison, 135 N.H. 1, 4, 599 A.2d 477, 479 (1991).

Because the trial court is in the best position to gauge prejudicial impact, it has broad discretion to determine whether a mistrial or other remedial action is necessary.

“To justify a mistrial, prejudicial testimony must be more than inadmissible, it must constitute an irreparable injustice that cannot be cured by jury instructions.” State v. Ellison, 135 N.H. 1, 4, 599 A.2d 477, 479 (1991) (quotations omitted).

Absent an abuse of that discretion, we will not overturn the trial court’s decision.

To justify a mistrial, the defendant must show that he has been irreparably harmed by the allegedly damaging testimony.

A trial court’s denial of a mistrial will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion, State v. Hunter, 132 N.H. 556, 561, 567 A.2d 564, 568 (1989), due to the trial court’s unique ability to gauge the reaction of the jury to any potentially prejudicial information, State v. Ellison, 135 N.H. 1, 4, 599 A.2d 477, 480 (1991); Lemire, 130 N.H. at 555, 543 A.2d at 427.

Prejudice is inherent when the jury is exposed to evidence of other similar crimes committed by the defendant.

We will not reverse a trial court’s decision on whether to grant a mistrial absent an abuse of discretion.

For example, we have upheld a trial judge’s choice of curative instructions over a declaration of mistrial where the offending remarks were ambiguous, see State v. Ellison, 135 N.H. 1, 4, 599 A.2d 477, 480 (1991), where the complaining party appeared to have brought the problem on himself, see Panas v. Harakis & K-Mart Corp., 129 N.H. 591, 614-15, 529 A.2d 976, 990 (1987), and where the incremental prejudicial effect of the remarks seemed to have been minimal, see Blais v. Town of Goffstown

We also note that although the defendants may have been entitled to a limiting instruction regarding the purpose for which the testimony was admitted, none was requested.

State v. Ellison, 135 N.H. 1, 4, 599 A.2d 477, 480 (1991); see also State v. Killam, 133 N.H. 458, 463, 578 A.2d 850, 853 (1990).